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Online Institutions, Markets, and Democracy 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I explore the implications of the advances in information and 
communication technology on democracy. In particular, I examine the roles of online 
institutions—search engines, news aggregators, and social media—in information 
readership and political outcomes. 
In Chapter 1, I show that information consumption pattern is more concentrated and 
polarized in online news traffic than in offline newspaper circulation. I then show that 
this pattern occurs not because online traffic better reflects people’s demand, but 
because online institutions generate a cascade. Using this evidence, I argue that online 
institutions produce a trade-off between the benefits involved when people access 
information and the costs of the cascade. In Chapter 3, I compare information 
consumption pattern on various online institutions. 
In Chapter 2, I explain why the cascade may become increasingly significant over 
time. An increase in Internet users suggests not only a reduced digital divide but also an 
even more concentrated and polarized online information consumption pattern as, 
ceteris paribus, the magnitude of the cascade will increase with an increase in the 
number of Internet users. I then empirically show a positive association between the 
traffic to an online institution and the estimated magnitude of the cascade observed on 
that site.  
vii 
 
In Chapter 4, I show that the observed concentrated and polarized online 
information consumption may affect political outcomes. For instance, if such an 
information consumption pattern affects political behaviors, we can expect the same 
pattern in measurable political outcomes. I test this prediction by investigating the 
association between U.S. Representatives using Twitter and their fundraising. Evidence 
suggests that, after politicians started using Twitter, their individual collected 
contributions became more concentrated, ideologically polarized, and geographically 
diverse. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for political equality, 
polarization, and democracy. 
In sum, online institutions may result in political outcomes becoming more 
concentrated and polarized. Given that a significant part of the observed concentration 
and polarization can be attributed to the cascade effect, this paper challenges the notion 
that Internet-mediated political actions or communications will necessarily promote 
democracy. 
 
viii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In retrospect, my academic interests trace back to my questions about the future of 
capitalism and democracy. Working as a management consultant and a civil servant, I 
observed a rising economic inequality, increasing political captures by the rising 
power of large corporations, and threatened political equality, the fundamental 
premise of democracy. Thus, the questions I had in mind were “why do we observe 
increasing economic inequality in many developed and developing societies?” and 
“how can we maintain a separation between economic influence and political equality 
in order to protect the administrative integrity and the values of democratic 
procedures?” Although I eventually became interested in the role of media, in terms 
of protecting the values of our democratic system, my interests have been inherently 
broad, as the proposed questions suggest. As a consequence, I have been advised by 
scholars from a wide range of different disciplines, to whom I would like to express 
my deepest appreciation. 
Throughout my dissertation-writing stage, I have been fortunate to receive 
invaluable support and advice from my thesis committee members, to whom I am 
deeply grateful. My principal advisor, Matthew Baum, has provided invaluable 
support and advice throughout every stage of my research. The other two committee 
members, Ryan Enos and Pinar Dogan, have given me insightful intellectual guidance 
and encouragement, patiently reading this dissertation and providing extremely 
helpful comments. I could have not written this dissertation without their advice, 
inspiration, and encouragement.  
ix 
 
I am also deeply grateful to Richard Zeckhauser, Erich Muehlegger, Robert 
Lawrence, Hunt Allcott (NYU), Jung-sik Kim (Yonsei), and Jung Pil-kwon (Yonsei) 
for their advice and encouragements. Without the support from Jung-sik Kim and Pil-
kwon Jung, both from Yonsei University, I could have not studied here at Harvard. 
Richard Zeckhauser has provided extremely helpful comments and taught me to think 
like an economist. Robert Lawrence, Erich Muehlegger, and Hunt Allcott provided 
extremely helpful support especially during my early years at Harvard, and at early 
stages of this dissertation. 
I am also truly grateful to Steven Kelman and Joshua Goodman, who generated 
helpful discussions regarding my research. I also thank Robert Stavins for the support 
I received from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program. Furthermore, I 
cannot forget the advice I received from Louisa van Baleen and Nicole Tateosian. I 
also want to thank Sydney Verba, Alberto Abadie, Todd Olmstead, Dani Rodrik, Kay 
Schlozman, Jeffrey Liebman, Rohini Pande, Susan Athey, Sendhil Mullainathan, 
Andrei Shleifer, Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, Chris Avery, Nolan Miller, and 
Richard Cooper for helpful discussion. I am also grateful to my fellow student 
colleagues, especially Daniel Nadler, for sharing his intellectually stimulating 
research ideas. This thesis has greatly benefited from discussions with Daniel. I also 
want to thank Maria Cecilia Acevedo for giving me helpful advice on my Ph.D. 
applications.  
Finally, my parents, older brother, and grandparents have provided invaluable 
love and encouragement. Since I first decided to pursue graduate studies, my parents 
have always cheered me on as I pursued my dream. The spiritual support I received 
x 
 
from my family has also been extremely helpful. My lovely wife and daughter, Jimin, 
have been a source of constant love and support. I am also deeply indebted to my 
parents-in-law for their invaluable support. I will always think fondly about the time I 
enjoyed with my wife and daughter here in Cambridge. I could not have written this 
dissertation without my family’s unceasing love and encouragement. I dedicate this 
dissertation to them. 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
ONLINE GATEKEEPERS AND CASCADE:  
CONCENTRATION, POLARIZATION, AND DEMOCRACY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1. DIVERSE INFORMATION, MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY 
A prerequisite for representative democracy is for citizens to vote in their own interests 
(Dahl 1961). Many democratic theorists
1
 contend that exposure to diverse information 
helps citizens to determine which candidates or policies will best represent their interests 
(Arendt 1968; Benhabib 1992; Fishkin 1991; Sunstein 2003; Baum 2006) and that it 
therefore benefits democracy (e.g., Barber 1984; Bellah et al. 1985; Habermas 1989; 
Mutz & Martin, 2001).
2
 For instance, Zaller states that “public attitudes toward major 
issues are a response to the relative intensity of competing political communications on 
those issues” (1992, 210).  
In a democracy, the mass media play an important role in enhancing the “relative 
intensity of competing political communications” by identifying problems in our society 
and supplying the political information upon which voters base their decisions. In 
                                                          
1 
Some others (for example, Popkin 1993, Lupia and McCubbins, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) 
have argued that reasoned choice does not require full information. 
2 
Previous research on “groupthink,” a concept first described by Janis (1982), has shown that group 
deliberation often produces worse decision-making than would be obtained without deliberation. A number 
of scholars (e.g., Sunstein 2003) have recommended diversity of information as a solution.  
2 
 
particular, the media may, through priming, framing, and agenda setting, influence 
people’s opinions by determining which considerations become the most salient, thereby 
influencing public opinion (Iyenga & Kinder, 1987; Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991; Nelson 
& Kinder 1996)
3
. For instance, most people have multiple considerations that might lead 
them either to agree with or to oppose most policies (Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 
1992), and “which of several competing ideas is at the top of a person’s head at a 
particular moment is more than pure accident; it depends on such things as what 
happened to be in the news that day” (Zaller 1992, 233). Information diversity has 
become even more important, as the media increasingly focus on controversy and 
conflict (Bennett 2003; Patterson, 1994, 2000).  
Many political scientists and communication scholars have also argued that the 
Internet is far more diverse than traditional forms of media. Scholars have predicted that 
individuals’ increased capacities to share, access, and produce content via the Internet 
would improve access to diverse information (for example, see Agre 2002; Bennett & 
Entman 2002) and increase attention to perspectives outside of the mainstream (Castells 
2000; Lupia & Sin, 2010). In fact, as many theorists (Benkler 2006; Jenkins 2006) have 
argued, the Internet has clearly increased access to a greater diversity of political 
information via new media such as online blogs and social media sites. In these outlets, a 
broader range of viewpoints are produced and presented by an increasing number of 
citizen journalists. In fact, Internet-mediated forms of communication have important 
implications for politics (Farrell 2012). 
                                                          
3
 Also see Jacobs & Shapiro 1994, Krosnick & Kinder 1990, McCombs & Shaw 1972, Entman 1993, 
Gamson & Lasch 1983, Gamson & Modigliani 1987, Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997 
3 
 
 
1.1.2. ONLINE INFORMATION DIVERSITY: SCOPE & CONCEPT 
In this study, I explore the effect of the Internet on online information diversity and 
discuss its political implications. In particular, I argue that the Internet makes information 
consumption pattern more concentrated and polarized in the online news market because 
of the cascade created by online gatekeepers.  
There are four considerations regarding the scope of this study. First, I examine 
information diversity here by considering “who speaks and who gets heard as two 
separate questions” (Hindman 2008, 16), and the discussion is limited to the demand side 
(information consumption patterns), ignoring the supply-side (availability of 
information). Even though the Internet provides a potential platform for everyone, online 
information consumption may not necessarily be more egalitarian than offline 
consumption.  
Second, I conceptualize and consider online information diversity from two different 
dimensions: vertical and horizontal. I define vertical diversity as the concentration of 
online attention for a specific theme or issue, and horizontal diversity as the range of 
viewpoints, within a specific theme, that receive a certain level of online attention.
4
 Thus, 
polarization of political information is a particular form of horizontally diverse political 
information in which viewpoints at the opposite extremes become increasingly popular.  
                                                          
4 
In other words, we say that the Internet is vertically diverse if online attention and readership is not 
concentrated on a particular source of information, whereas the Internet is horizontally diverse if a broad 
range of viewpoints is well represented online. 
4 
 
Third, in this study, I look at diversity of information consumption in a market as a 
whole. Information diversity from the standpoint of individuals may not match the 
perspective of the market as a whole and may also have differing political implications. 
With increasingly personalized electronic media (Negroponte 1995, Sunstein 2007), 
individual information consumption may become less horizontally diverse, but relatively 
little has been discussed about the horizontal diversity of information consumption in a 
larger online space (e.g., an online news market). For instance, analyzing information 
consumption in online news markets as a whole can answer whether news with more 
politically extreme editorial positions is more successful online than offline, which may 
have significant implications for political polarization. 
Fourth, among the various sources of online information, I focus on the online news 
market. Despite the overwhelming amount of online information available from various 
sources, most people still trust and rely on the information provided by news 
organizations (Hargittai 2007, Pew 2011), and the Internet is increasingly becoming a 
popular platform for online news consumption (Pew 2010).
5
 Accordingly, the online 
news industry deserves special attention in any investigation of the impact of the Internet 
on democracy and society. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the competing 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains my data. Section 4 describes the empirical framework 
used for analysis, presents the empirical tests, and discusses their results. Finally, Section 
                                                          
5 
The Internet as a news platform is already more popular than newspapers, ranking just behind TV (Pew 
2010).  
 
5 
 
5 addresses the implications and conclusions of this study. 
 
1.2. COMPETING HYPOTHESES: QUALITY OR CASCADE  
Ever since White (1950) investigated the daily decisions of a newspaper editor, “Mr. 
Gates,” the concept of news selection by a gatekeeper has been one of the most important 
theories in political communication and agenda-setting research (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972, Baum & Groeling 2008). More recently, many scholars (e.g., Benkler 2006, 
Williams & Carpini 2000, Hewitt 2005, Trippi 2004) have argued that the Internet’s most 
important political impact comes from the demise of the influence of these old media 
gatekeepers. As evidence increasingly suggests (e.g., Hindman 2009), however, new 
types of gatekeepers have emerged online, remaining a critical factor even in the Internet 
age. These new online gatekeepers are online institutions or intermediaries—such as 
search engines, news aggregators, and social media sites—which retrieve, filter, and rank 
the massive amount of online political information.  
Previous studies have identified two possible negative consequences of the Internet 
and online gatekeepers in politics—higher concentration and polarization—which I 
interpret as a decrease in vertical diversity but an increase in horizontal. Hargittai (2000) 
and Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) were among the first to consider the potential 
negative impact of search engines on the scope of online information access for the rest 
of society. Subsequently, some scholars (e.g., Hindman et al. 2003) have provided 
evidence of the role of online gatekeepers in amplifying the dominance of established 
6 
 
and already-popular websites. Other scholars have also argued that the Internet may 
change politics for the worse because of its polarizing effect. Putnam (2000) raised the 
possibility of “cyberapartheid” and “cyberbalkanization.” Sunstein (2001, 2007) 
contends that the Internet is likely to weaken democracy by creating a fragmented 
communication market and increasing political polarization. DiMaggio et al. (2001) also 
suggest that the Internet’s capacity for personalized information sources may heighten 
the level of extremism. Prior (2007) and Baum and Groeling (2008) show that a greater 
choice of media outlets has contributed to partisan polarization as people can “self-
select” the political information that matches and reinforces their ideological positions.  
However, although previous studies have reported some evidence on the role of 
online gatekeepers in generating more concentrated and polarized online distribution 
patterns, they have done little to explain why this happens. To fill this gap in the 
literature, I investigate two possible explanations.
6
 The first, the quality hypothesis, is 
that online gatekeepers allow people consciously and voluntarily to choose the piece of 
information with the highest intrinsic quality based on people’s private signals. Here, I 
assume that, as in previous studies (e.g. Bikhchandani et al. 1992, and Banerjee 1992), 
people independently have private information, which is often termed “signals,” about 
                                                          
6 
The more concentrated and polarized online distribution patterns observed may be explained by three 
different origins. (1) The supply-side explanation is that because the Internet provides a potential platform 
for people to publish exceptionally appealing or ideologically extreme ideas online, this increased supply 
of new types of information concentrates and polarizes online readerships. (2) The demand-side 
explanation is that the Internet concentrates and polarizes online readerships as it allows people to consume 
exceptionally appealing or ideologically extreme ideas, which they could have not accessed without the 
Internet (3) The institutional-side explanation is that online institutions concentrate and polarize online 
readerships through the gatekeeping process for reasons other than the demand-side factor can explain—
for instance, cascading. In this study, I hold the supply-side factor constant, as the sample includes 337 
daily newspapers over a relatively short time. The quality hypothesis is related to the demand-side 
explanation, whereas the cascade hypothesis is related to the institutional explanation. 
7 
 
quality, and I define quality as the subjective value of the news information, which might 
be “either personally useful or merely entertaining” (Zaller, 2003). Thus, I do not assume 
that soft news is necessarily inaccurate or inferior (Baum, 2003, 2005; Baum and 
Jamison, 2006). The second explanation, the cascade
7 8
 hypothesis, holds that the 
cascading process makes online traffic more concentrated and polarized as people rely on 
the information filtered by online gatekeepers regardless of their private signals 
concerning the information’s intrinsic quality.9  
Several studies (e.g., Hindman et al. 2003) have discussed the role of online 
gatekeepers in making online attention more concentrated, but few have explained their 
                                                          
7 
Informational cascade is generally defined as having occurred “if an individual’s action does not depend 
on his private information signal” (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, p.1000). 
8 
In this study, I define the term “cascade” broadly to describe the different types of cascade that occur with 
different types of online gatekeepers. Sunstein (2007) uses the term cybercascade for that which arises in 
Internet space and distinguishes between two kinds of cascade: informational and reputational. In the case 
of the cascade created by search engines, it is difficult to tell whether the resulting cascading process is 
informational or reputational due to their complicated algorithm. This issue is considered in Barton (2009), 
in which the cascade in the context of search engines is called “Google cascade.” Barton asserts that 
“Google cascade” occurs when an individual, having searched for something on Google, follows the 
behavior of the Google results without regard to his own information. Barton contends that Google cascade 
exhibits the characteristics of both information and reputation cascades, as Google’s algorithm is based on 
both the number of sites that link to the particular site in question and the relative popularity or reputation 
of the linking sites (see also Pasquale 2006, Lastowka 2007, Grimmelmann 2009; see Sunstein 2007 for the 
definition of reputational cascade; See Google.com, Technology Overview, http://www.Google.com/ 
corporate/tech.html for information on Google’s algorithm.) 
9 
In addition to the cascade, previous studies (e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1992) have suggested alternative 
primary mechanisms for uniform social behavior including (1) sanctions on deviants, (2) network effect 
with positive payoff externalities, (3) conformity preference, and (4) communication. In order to rule out 
these alternative explanations, I later introduce a common example in which Google’s algorithm can create 
herd behavior. Suppose that I want to hyperlink the term “federalism” on my website. Therefore, I search 
for the term with Google, click through to the first result, and hyperlink it after a quick confirmation that 
the content matches with what I have in mind. As this heuristic example suggests, search engines or other 
online media institutions may create herding, as people often decide which sites to link or click by seeing 
the site that search engines or other media institutions rank first (or one of the first few). In this example, 
herd behavior may arise even without any sanctions enforced or the positive externalities that may result 
from selecting the first search result. Moreover, the resulting herd behavior in the example may arise even 
without people’s inherent wish to conform to the behavior of others and lacking any communication about 
the benefits of the sites. In fact, as this example suggests, herd behavior arises in many cases as people tend 
to use the most vivid or convenient piece of information as a benchmark when they collect information, 
even when this information is not appropriate (Jervis, 1993; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
8 
 
potential role in polarizing political information. Online gatekeepers can help people 
“self-select” ideologically extreme information and polarize information consumption in 
at least two ways. According to the quality hypothesis, online gatekeepers help people 
read politically extreme ideas online, to which people have wanted access but previously 
could not without the Internet because of the high cost of access.
10
 On the other hand, 
according to the cascade hypothesis, all else being equal, online gatekeepers tend to more 
easily identify, and thus rank higher, the more salient information. Farrell and Drezner 
(2008) find that online focal points allow “interesting” opinions—for instance, new or 
neglected issues—to rise to the “top” of the blogosphere and be more easily identified by 
online gatekeepers. Obviously, convincing and well-argued facts and arguments are 
“interesting,” but another way not to be overlooked by online gatekeepers is to post 
unique stories that not many people have discussed before—for instance, politically 
extreme viewpoints.  
In this study, I argue that online gatekeepers concentrate and polarize people's 
information consumption patterns mainly through cascade. Although both the quality and 
cascade hypotheses may lead to the same outcome, their implications for democracy and 
social welfare differ if we assume that typical individuals prefer—all else being equal—
more accurate and socially desirable information, and that their private signals are 
correct, on average. According to the quality hypothesis, the observed winner-take-all 
distribution pattern occurs because online gatekeepers help people find the information 
                                                          
10 
For example, suppose that a person in Massachusetts had wanted to read a radically conservative 
newspaper before the Internet was introduced, but he could not because the type of newspaper he was 
looking for was not published in Massachusetts. With the Internet, however, he can search for and compare 
different newspapers and choose to visit them regularly. 
9 
 
with the best quality—the most accurate and socially desirable—out of a massive amount 
of online information. This process might then improve social welfare and deliberation 
for democracy. On the other hand, according to the cascade hypothesis, there is a trade-
off between low-cost information access and cascade; online gatekeepers allow people to 
access new information at lower costs, but this benefit comes at the cost of a significant 
cascade. With this tradeoff, the Internet will not necessarily improve either social welfare 
or deliberation for democracy.  
Thus, this study answers three different sets of questions. (1) I test whether online 
news consumption is more concentrated online than offline and whether news from 
sources with politically extreme editorial positions commands more attention online than 
offline. (2) I report the empirical association between the role of online gatekeepers and 
the observed concentration and polarization of information consumption in the online 
news market. (3) I present empirical evidence that leads to supporting the cascade 
hypothesis and rejecting the quality hypothesis.  
 
1.3. DATA  
1.3.1. NEWS READERSHIP 
The newspaper industry is one of the few industries in which reliable data is available for 
both online and offline readerships of relatively identical products. Newspaper 
companies usually publish the same articles in their printed and online versions, and we 
can collect reliable data across the entire industry regarding offline subscriptions to 
10 
 
newspapers and the numbers of unique visitors to newspapers’ websites. In this paper, I 
define online and offline readerships by the market shares of their audiences, as follows. 
 
          
                 
                   
 
            
                  
               
 
 
The online readership of newspaper i is the share of unique visitors to the website of this 
newspaper out of the total of unique visitors to all websites of U.S. daily newspapers. 
The offline readership of newspaper i is the share of average circulation of this 
newspaper out of the total average circulation of all U.S. daily newspapers.  
I created a data set of online and offline readerships for 337 daily newspapers. This 
number includes nearly all major U.S. newspapers except for community newspapers and 
those that do not have their own websites.
11
 In the analysis, I did not include newspapers 
whose unique visitor information could not be found. The average circulations of the 
U.S. daily newspapers were taken from the Audit Bureau of Circulation, and they cover 
two six-month periods: April 1, 2010, to September 30, 2010, and October 1, 2010, to 
March 31, 2011. I purchased the data for online unique visitors from Compete, Inc., to 
cover the period from April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011.  
                                                          
11 
For example, some newspapers in Michigan were excluded because they share a website 
(www.mlive.com) and do not maintain individual websites. 
11 
 
Based on the sites that people use before visiting a given newspaper website, I 
disaggregated the data describing the number of monthly online unique visitors into 
direct traffic and referred traffic. Direct traffic refers to the online traffic that is not 
referred by any other websites (e.g., when a person types www.nytimes.com directly into 
the web address bar and visits the New York Times website). Referred traffic can be 
further disaggregated depending on the site that referred the traffic (e.g., search engine 
traffic, news aggregator traffic, and social media traffic).  
One difficulty of grouping online traffic in the above manner is the possible 
ambiguity between search engine traffic and direct traffic. For example, certain 
individuals type the name of a specific newspaper into the Google search engine in order 
to visit the newspaper’s website. In this case, the traffic, though not different from direct 
traffic, would be classified as search engine traffic. To avoid this problem, I collected 
data on the keywords that people used to reach a given newspaper website and 
reclassified this traffic from search engine traffic to direct traffic if the keywords were 
variants of the name of each newspaper. For example, to visit the New York Times 
website, some people directly typed keywords related to the name of the paper, such as 
new york times, nytimes, or nyt. I reclassified the traffic that was generated from these 
searches (i.e., name search traffic) from search engine traffic to direct traffic. 
Another difficulty arose because of paid search, an advertising strategy wherein 
website owners pay a fee to have their website displayed more prominently in search 
engine results. As the share of paid search is generally too small to affect the results of 
12 
 
this analysis
12
 and because paid searches are not a focus for this study, I subtracted the 
volume of paid search traffic from search engine traffic.  
 
1.3.2. POLITICALLY EXTREME INDEX & COVARIATES 
Another important variable of interest is newspapers’ editorial positions in terms of 
political ideology. As newspapers’ ideological positions are unobservable, I follow 
previous studies (e.g., Chiang and Knight 2012) in using the average political preferences 
of people who self-report to read the newspapers as a proxy. This variable comes from 
2008 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) conducted by the Annenberg Public 
Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania. The survey asked respondents which 
newspaper they read most regularly and inquired after their self-reported political 
ideology from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). I first subtracted 4 
from this individual ideology score and took its absolute value so that 0 means moderate 
and a positive number means more politically extreme (either conservative or liberal). 
Then, for each news outlet i, I defined an absolute extremism index by taking the average 
of the score from individuals who answered that they read newspaper i most regularly, 
and then transforming the values logarithmically in order to interpret coefficients as 
percentage differences. Among the 337 daily newspapers in our sample, this index was 
                                                          
12
 The data provided by Compete, Inc., show that paid searches account for only 0.6 percent of the total 
traffic to newspaper websites.  
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available for 335 outlets.
13
 To be specific, newspaper i’s extreme index is as follows, 
where subscript r is a respondent and i is a news outlet.  
 
                                         
 
I also generated indicator variables for newspapers that either instituted a paywall or 
provided specialized content news. Only two (the Wall Street Journal and Long Island 
Newsday) have a paywall, and three (American Banker, Investor’s Business Daily, and 
Women’s Wear Daily) are classified as a specialized newspaper. I did not classify the Wall 
Street Journal as a specialized newspaper so that the specialized news indicator 
coefficient would reflect how online readership might change as small newspapers 
specialize their content.  
 
1.4. RESULTS  
1.4.1. POLARIZATION 
To see the role that gatekeepers play in online concentration and polarization, I first 
looked at evidence of polarization with the following regression. The dependent variable 
is the log-transformed share of online readership, and the variable of interest is 
newspaper i’s politically extreme index,          . 
                                                          
13 
For a small subset of my sample, I was able to obtain the slant index developed by Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2010). The correlation between the average ideology variable developed above and the slant index 
was positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01).  
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                                                (1) 
 
The set of covariates    includes whether newspaper i has a paywall or provides 
contents specialized for business news. I also include time-fixed effect    and control 
for the share of offline circulation to estimate the extreme editorial positions on online 
readership, holding constant the offline readership levels. In this equation, a positive 
coefficient   implies that, all else being equal, newspapers with more ideologically 
extreme positions have a higher readership online.  
I then test the empirical association between the role of online gatekeepers and the 
estimated coefficients   by replacing the dependent variable           with the share 
of online readership generated by different gatekeepers: direct traffic, search engine 
traffic, news aggregator traffic, and social media traffic. Specifically, (1) if the quality 
hypothesis is true—that is, if the polarization occurs as people consciously and 
voluntarily try to find extreme content on the Internet—coefficient   should be 
significant when I use           with direct traffic as the dependent variable. On the 
other hand, (2) if the cascade hypothesis is true—that is, if people rely on the information 
filtered by online gatekeepers, regardless of their private signals, and if online 
gatekeepers tend to amplify the salience of extreme content—coefficient   should be 
more significant, both statistically and substantially, when I use           with search 
engine traffic, news aggregator traffic, and social media traffic compared to when I use it 
with direct traffic. The key assumption is that direct traffic—the online traffic generated 
15 
 
by typing the site address directly into the web address bar—better reflects people’s true 
preferences based on their private signals concerning quality, than does referred traffic.  
Table 1.1 shows the estimated results. First, column 1 in Table 1.1 shows a positive 
association between the extreme index and total online readership. This evidence 
suggests that news from sources with politically extreme editorial positions gain more 
attention online than offline. Second, column 2 in Table 1.1 allows us to reject the quality 
hypothesis. As explained, if the quality hypothesis were true, column 2 should have 
produced a significantly positive association between the extreme index and direct traffic 
as in column 1. However, as can be seen in column 2, the extremism premium is no 
longer observed if we look at only the direct traffic. Third, columns 3–5 imply that online 
gatekeepers play a role in amplifying the salience of extreme ideas as they show that the 
extreme index is positively associated with search, aggregators, and social media traffic, 
respectively. These results suggest that search, aggregators, and social media traffic, 
rather than the direct traffic, are driving the positive association observed in column 1, 
which leads us to reject the quality hypothesis and support the cascade hypothesis.  
In sum, this result implies that online gatekeepers do help information from 
ideologically extreme sources to gain popularity. Ceteris paribus, news sites with the 
most politically extreme positions generate online traffic that is 8 percent higher than 
traffic for those with the average extreme index.14 The partial scatter plots shown in 
Figure 1.1 give a visual sense of the coefficients of the extreme index in Table 1.1. The 
                                                          
14
 The maximum extreme index is 3, whereas its mean value is 0.72. A 320 percent increase in the index is 
associated with about an 8 percent increase in online traffic.  
16 
 
fitted lines with linear parametric assumptions have significantly positive slopes, both 
statistically and substantially, when the vertical axes are           with search engine 
traffic, news aggregator traffic, and social media traffic (Figures 1.1.2, 1.1.3, and 1.1.4), 
but not with direct traffic (Figure 1.1.1).
15
  
 
 
                                                          
15
 Further, these partial scatter plots show another important point missing in Table 1.1; the extreme group 
of news organizations—for instance, the group with an extreme index value above 1.5—has a higher share 
of online readerships even when we use direct traffic (Figure 1.1.1). This point is more obvious if we fit the 
data with a non-parametric assumption (for instance, with Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing). 
In sum, with regard to the extreme group of news organizations, I could not reject both the quality and 
cascade hypothesis. However, except for those in the highly extreme group, the estimated results support 
only the cascade hypothesis. 
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Table 1.1: Test of the Role of Online Gatekeepers on Polarization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable is           constructed by 
 
Total UV 
Direct 
Traffic 
Search 
Traffic 
News Aggregators 
Traffic 
Social Media 
traffic 
      
         0.024
*
 0.001 0.036
**
 0.028
**
 0.039
**
 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
      
         -0.630
**
 -0.651
**
 -0.789
**
 -1.002
**
 -0.316
**
 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.074) (0.083) (0.054) 
      
             0.524
**
 0.559
**
 0.147 -0.829
**
 -0.580
**
 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.107) 
      
            1.161
**
 0.992
**
 1.271
**
 1.188
**
 0.999
**
 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
      
N 3826 3473 3473 3473 3473 
adj. R
2
 0.797 0.750 0.734 0.692 0.602 
 
Note:  
1. Standard errors in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 
2. All specifications use time fixed effects 
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FIGURE 1.1: Direct Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
1.1.1 Direct Traffic vs. Extreme Index 
 
1.1.2 Search Traffic vs. Extreme Index 
 
 
Note:  
 
Partial scatter plot of log share of 
online readership against log 
extreme index (based on Table 1.1; 
the axes represent components 
orthogonal to other regressors.)  
 
 
 
1.1.3 News Aggregators Traffic vs. Extreme Index 
 
 
1.1.4 Social Media Traffic vs. Extreme Index 
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1.4.2. ONLINE CONCENTRATION  
I conducted two different analyses for testing online concentration. First, to see whether 
readership is more concentrated online than offline, I plotted Lorenz curves
16
 for the 
distributions of both online and offline readerships and conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) tests. Second, to see whether higher online concentration has something to do with 
online gatekeepers and whether the data supports either the cascade or the quality 
hypothesis, I ran quantile regressions.  
 
FIGURE 1.2: Online Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
 
 
 
The estimated Lorenz curves and the K-S tests show clearly that the readership is 
more concentrated online than offline. Figure 1.2 plots Lorenz curves for online and 
offline readerships and shows that the top 10 percent of newspapers attract about 50 
                                                          
16  
A graphical representation of the cumulative distribution function of the empirical probability 
distribution. Every point on the curve represents a statement, such as “The bottom x percent of all 
newspapers have y percent of the total readerships.” 
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percent of the total offline readership but almost 70 percent of the total online readership. 
The results of the K-S tests (Table 1.2) clearly reject the null hypothesis that the 
distributions of online and offline readerships are equal.  
 
Table 1.2: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Equality of the Two Distributions: 
Online Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
Smaller Group Coefficient D P-value Corrected 
Offline circulation 0.0121 0.562  
Online traffic -0.3044 0.000  
Combined Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 0.3044 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Then, to explore the association between the observed online concentration and 
gatekeepers, I ran the following quantile regression:
17
  
 
                                       (2) 
 
       is the log-transformed readership of newspaper i, and         is an indicator 
variable that is 1 if the readership of newspaper i is online and 0 if offline. The other 
                                                          
17
 An alternative way to conduct this test is to see whether the association between             and 
          is nonlinear and whether it increases in            . However, there are two reasons for 
conducting quantile regression instead of ordinary least squares (OLS). First, as I discuss in this study, the 
higher online concentration is driven by only a small number of outliers (the top 4–5 news organizations), 
and quantile regression is a better tool for observing this impact than OLS, as OLS tests the mean impact 
with a parametric assumption. Second, quantile regression tells us the impact on distributions, not on 
individual newspapers. Thus, even if a news outlet with high circulation did not have an increase in share 
of online traffic, it might still be true that outlets in the top quantile have a higher share of readership online 
than offline. (See Angrist and Pischke 2008, p. 281, for further information on this subtle difference). 
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variables are as defined in equation 1. The coefficient    is the estimated difference 
between online and offline readerships at quantile  . For example, if       were 3 
percent, the online readership of the top 1 percent of newspapers would be 3 percent 
higher than the offline readership of the top 1 percent of newspapers.  
 
FIGURE 1.3: Online Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
 
 
Table 1.4 reports the estimated quantile regression coefficients, and Figures 1.3 and 
1.4 plot the estimated coefficients    of equation (1) at each quantile   with a 95 
percent confidence interval.
18
 As presented in column (1) of Table 1.4, the online 
readership of the topmost newspapers is, on average, 39 percent higher than that of the 
offline ones. This result is driven by a small number of national newspapers; Table 1.3 
shows the differences in the offline and online readerships of five news organizations, the 
                                                          
18 
See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for applied examples of quantile regression analysis.  
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largest in terms of circulation. During the data collection period, four out of the five 
biggest newspapers—except for The Wall Street Journal, which maintained a paywall 
during observations—had a significantly higher readership online than offline.19 The 
online and offline readerships of small
20
 newspapers differ little in terms of magnitude, 
but the online readership for the middle group was about 4–7 percent lower than its 
offline readership, which is consistent with prior research that reports a “missing middle” 
(Hindman 2008). 
I then use disaggregated online traffic (direct traffic, search engine traffic, news 
aggregator traffic, and social media traffic) in place of the online readership for the 
dependent variable to test the role of online gatekeepers. Specifically, (1) if the quality 
hypothesis is true,        will be significant when I use direct traffic for the dependent 
variable. On the other hand, (2) if the cascade hypothesis is true, I expect that the 
observed dominance of topmost news organizations, estimated by       , will be more 
significant, both statistically and substantially, when I use search engine traffic, news 
aggregator traffic, and social media traffic, as opposed to using direct traffic for the 
dependent variable. 
Column 2 in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4 allows us to reject the quality hypothesis. As 
explained, if the quality hypothesis were true, replacing the dependent variable with the 
readerships constructed by direct traffic should have resulted in estimates similar to that 
                                                          
19 
This finding is expected, given that The Wall Street Journal was the only newspaper company that 
instituted a paywall between April 2010 and March 2011, requiring individuals to pay a fee in order to 
access a large percentage of the newspaper’s stories. 
20 
The bottom 10 percent in terms of readership 
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in Figure 1.3. This is because direct traffic may be regarded as a proxy for what the total 
traffic would have been without online gatekeepers (Hong 2012). However, the two 
results (Figures 1.3 and 1.4.1) look completely different, with the top newspapers having 
no higher readerships online than offline in Figure 1.4.1, although the coefficients were 
not significant.  
Columns 3–5 in Table 1.4 support the cascade hypothesis. In the case of search 
engine traffic, top newspapers hold about an 88 percent higher readership online than 
offline. I found similar results by constructing online readerships with news aggregator 
traffic (e.g., Yahoo! News or the Drudge Report) and social media traffic (e.g., Facebook 
and Twitter).  
 
  
 
2
4
 
Table 1.4: Test of the Role of Online Gatekeepers on Concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable is         constructed by 
Quantile 
Total UV 
vs. Circulation 
Direct Traffic 
vs. Circulation 
Search Traffic 
vs. Circulation 
Aggregators Traffic 
vs. Circulation 
Social Media traffic 
vs. Circulation 
      
99% 0.392
**
 0.001 0.882
**
 0.424
**
 0.346
**
 
 (0.088) (0.066) (0.166) (0.061) (0.084) 
      
90% -0.049
**
 -0.061
**
 0.014
**
 -0.037 -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.035) (0.026) (0.017) 
      
70% -0.068
**
 -0.037
**
 -0.070
**
 -0.045
**
 -0.028
**
 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
      
50% -0.051
**
 -0.024
**
 -0.052
**
 -0.041
**
 -0.017
**
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
      
30% -0.042
**
 -0.017
**
 -0.048
**
 -0.045
**
 -0.019
**
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
      
10% -0.033
**
 -0.016
**
 -0.040
**
 -0.035
**
 -0.024
**
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
N 7853 7429 7433 7445 7445 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 
2. All specifications use time fixed effects 
3. Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
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FIGURE 1.4: Direct Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
1.4.1 Direct Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
 
1.4.2 Search Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
 
 
Note:  
 
1. The gray area is the confidence 
interval 
2. See Koenker and Hallock (2001) 
for examples of graphical analysis 
using quantile regression analysis. 
 
 
 
1.4.3 News Aggregators Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
 
 
1.4.4 Social Media Traffic vs. Offline Circulation 
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Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show additional evidence that relates to and further supports 
these findings. Figure 1.5 plots the proportion of the direct traffic of total online 
unique visitors against the rank in terms of total online traffic. This graph suggests 
that most of the online traffic received by top news websites is referred by online 
gatekeepers, whereas small newspapers receive a significant portion of their online 
traffic directly. Figure 1.6 indicates a similar finding. People use search engines to 
visit both well-known and smaller newspaper websites, but how they use the search 
engines is different. People who visit well-known newspaper websites are usually 
referred by search engines after they search for keywords contained in the news 
articles. People who visit smaller newspapers also use search engines, but they search 
for the names of specific newspapers or sites rather than using keywords from the 
articles.  
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FIGURE 1.5: The share of direct traffic out of total online traffic vs. the rank in 
terms of online traffic 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6: The ratio of name search to the rank in terms of online traffic 
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1.4.3. DO THE SAME NEWSPAPER COMPANIES CONSISTENTLY BENEFIT FROM THE INTERNET? 
As a way to check the robustness of the finding, I test whether the observed benefit that 
the top news organizations receive is consistent over time. If the observed high 
concentration results from the inherently volatile nature of online traffic and the same 
newspapers do not get consistent benefits over time, the findings of this study would be 
of less concern.  
In order to rule out this concern, I calculated the ratio of online readerships to offline 
readerships for the five biggest news organizations, as follows, and plotted their 
variations over time. As shown in Figure 1.7, I find that the ratio has been consistent over 
time for the five biggest news organizations.  
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Table 1.3: Average differences in the offline and online readerships of the five biggest newspaper: April, 2010 - March, 2011 
Newspapers 
Offline readership 
(Share of circulation) 
Online readership 
(Share of unique visitors) 
The ratio of online readership to offline 
readership 
LA Times 2.16% 4.46% 106% 
New York Times 3.21% 10.47% 226% 
USA Today 6.55% 11.28% 72% 
Washington Post 1.96% 4.46% 127% 
Wall Street Journal 7.48% 5.12% -32% 
 
FIGURE 1.7 : Five largest newspaper companies: offline vs. online readerships 
 
Vertical axis is the ratio of online readership (constructed by unique visitors) to offline readership.
-100% 
-50% 
0% 
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150% 
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latimes.com 
nytimes.com 
usatoday.com 
washingtonpost.com 
wsj.com 
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1.5. FINDINGS, DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
This study finds that news readership is more concentrated and polarized online than 
offline. The evidence suggests that a very small number of “top” news organizations is 
driving the high concentration of online news readership. In particular, the online 
readership of the top 1 percent of news organizations is 39 percent higher than for a 
comparable group of news outlets offline. I show that the online readership of the five 
largest newspapers is double their offline readership and that these figures were 
consistent over the data collection period. The benefit these large organizations receive 
online seems to surpass considerably the advantages of the physical distribution channels 
they enjoyed in the offline market. Findings also suggest that news organizations having 
a group of readers with politically extreme positions command more attention online than 
offline. Ceteris paribus, news sites with the most politically extreme positions generate 
online traffic that is 8 percent higher than the traffic for those with an average extreme 
index. 
The evidence also suggests that online gatekeepers play a significant role in making 
online information readerships more concentrated and polarized. I observed both 
dominance by the largest news organizations and an increase in online readership for 
politically extreme news outlets, but only when I used online traffic referred by an online 
gatekeeper to measure online readerships as opposed to when I used direct traffic. 
Because direct traffic can be viewed as a proxy for the choices people make when 
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following their private signals, these findings are better explained by the cascade 
hypothesis than by the quality hypothesis.  
Online gatekeepers make online information vertically less and horizontally more 
diverse, based on my definition of information diversity. A lower vertical diversity (a 
higher concentration) may undermine our hope that the Internet will disrupt the long-
standing patterns of participatory inequality in American politics by increasing attention 
to perspectives outside of the mainstream. Further, evidence of the cascade hypothesis 
indicates that it is incorrect to assume that elite domination—a situation in which “elites 
induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best available 
information and analysis” (Zaller, 1992, 313)—would necessarily become less prevalent 
with the Internet. 
However, the political implications of higher horizontal diversity (polarization) might 
be multi-faceted. The increasing polarization of American politics (Poole & Rosenthal 
2001) may have potentially negative consequences on democracy. However, in fact, 
many historical movements that later turned out to be of great value—for instance, civil 
rights, gender equality, and the antislavery movements—may well have been sparked 
from voices that were viewed as politically extreme at that time (Sunstein 2007). 
Similarly, as the recent “Twitter revolution” and the uprisings of the “Arab Spring” 
suggest, a certain form of online gatekeeping may amplify the voices suppressed by the 
regime and empower social movements (Diamond 2010, Boyd 2012), but this technology 
may also be used by criminals and political or religious extremists to maximize their 
voices (Deibert & Rohozinski 2010).  
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Two points deserve mention before I conclude. First, this study has been limited to 
the demand side of online information, but the results imply that online information will 
be even more polarized if we take into account the behavioral responses on the supply 
side of information. That is, given the evidence that news sites receive greater online 
attention by gatekeepers if they provide ideologically extreme news content (Table 1.1), 
it is possible and even likely that rational news organizations may become increasingly 
extreme in their editorial positions. More importantly, this evidence suggests that news 
organizations may become increasingly extreme not only in response to the American 
audience who increasingly polarizes over matters of politics (Gentzkow & Shapiro 2006) 
but also in response to people's increasing dependence on online gatekeepers. This 
important implication should be tested in future research.   
Second, previous studies that have examined the Internet’s role in the increasing 
political polarization have looked at individual information consumption, rather than 
consumption in the market as a whole (Negroponte 1995; Sunstein 2002, 2007; Mutz 
2006). I agree that individual information consumption patterns—if combined with more 
aggregate-level evidence, such as the type this study presents—may significantly 
improve our understanding of the Internet’s political implications. This important piece 
of information lies beyond the scope of this study.  
Coming back to the question at the beginning of this paper, I argue that the evidence 
presented in this study shows that online gatekeepers produce a trade-off between the 
lower costs of access to political information viewed from individuals' standpoints, and 
the higher costs of a more concentrated and polarized online information readership from 
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the viewpoint of a market or society as a whole. The costs of online gatekeepers to a 
society arise not from the mere fact that information becomes more concentrated and 
polarized, but rather from the underlying mechanisms through which concentration and 
polarization occur—the cascade hypothesis. This cascading process implies that the risk 
of elite domination as well as the trade-off between the two central components of 
deliberative democracy (Fishkin 2009)—inclusion and thoughtfulness21—may persist in 
many Internet-mediated forms of deliberation. Taken as a whole, this evidence challenges 
the notion that a greater variety of political information available on the Internet will 
necessarily benefit democracy.  
                                                          
21
 For instance, many scholars have argued that democratic reforms that emphasize inclusion by providing 
power to the people tend to undermine collective thoughtfulness by failing to motivate citizens to 
thoroughly consider underlying issues. 
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1.6. APPENDIX 
 
DATA SOURCES  
 
Variables Data Source 
Circulation  
Audit Bureau of Circulation, e-Circ dataset 
www.accessabc.com 
Unique visitors  
www. compete.com 
Direct traffic 
Search engines traffic 
News aggregators traffic 
Social media traffic 
Extreme index 2008 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) 
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CHAPTER 2:  
WHY SHOULD WE EXPECT THE CASCADE TO INCREASE OVER TIME? 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to conventional wisdom, an increase in the number of Internet users will 
surmount the digital divide and lead to better democracy (e.g., Norris 2001). However, in 
this chapter, and perhaps counter-intuitively, I show that the increasing number of 
Internet users leads to a trade-off as long as people rely on online institutions to source 
information. In other words, an increase in the number of Internet users suggests a more 
concentrated consumption pattern of online information, since all else being equal, the 
magnitude of the cascade will increase with the number of Internet users. 
In Chapter 1, I showed that the Internet has a negative impact on the diversity of 
information consumption, due to cascades created by online institutions. In the current 
chapter, I show that the magnitude of this negative impact may itself increase as the 
number of Internet users increases. Using a formal analytic model, this chapter explains 
why an increase in the number of Internet users makes the Internet less, rather than more, 
diverse, and then tests the prediction by showing evidence of an association between the 
number of visitors to a news aggregator site and the estimated level of the cascade on the 
aggregator site. 
Many online institutions might create cascades. However, this paper focuses on 
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online news aggregators. The Internet has reshaped the news industries by providing 
people with easy access to news. One of the advances of digitization, in turn, has been 
the development of online aggregators such as Yahoo! News and Google News, which 
have become major outlets for online news consumption. Indeed, 2010 report by the Pew 
Project for Excellence in Journalism found that the total amount of traffic to the top three 
newspaper sites—The New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today—is less than 
the traffic to Yahoo! News, the top news aggregator site. 
A growing literature explores the role of aggregators and their effects on the 
economy. Recently, several studies have attempted to incorporate the interplay between 
website aggregators and readers’ consumption of news content. Athey et al. (2011) 
provide a model that analyzes the impacts of blogs, aggregators, and paywalls on outlet 
profits from advertising. George and Hogendorn (2012) put forth a model showing how 
search technology and aggregation can alter both market participation and the number of 
sites visited which can affect equilibrium prices and profits in the advertising market. 
Dellarocas et al. (2011) model the implications of interrelated and strategic hyper-linking 
and content investments. 
Although previous models have provided valuable insights into the interplay between 
website aggregators and content providers, they do not incorporate one of the important 
roles of aggregators: That is, aggregators rank news content, and this ranking is subject 
to cascade. For example, consider the “most popular” section in Yahoo! News. Because 
Yahoo! News sorts articles by popularity, any visitor is necessarily affected by the 
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choices, preferences, and opinions of others.
1
 In this case, if people have imperfect 
information regarding the quality of news content and are therefore more likely to click 
on content with higher rankings, the result is a cascade. 
Several studies have already found evidence of cascades on the Internet, although not 
with respect to online news aggregators. For instance, Hindman (2008) finds that among 
the hundreds of thousands of political blogs in the United States, most of the online 
traffic goes to a handful of mainstream, professionally written blogs. Further, Duan et al. 
(2008) argue that vast amounts of increasingly sophisticated information, coupled with 
the availability of information about product popularity and other online users’ choices, 
make cascades more feasible on the Internet. In an experiment, Salganik et al. (2006) 
find that the availability of information on the choices of others influences both 
inequality and unpredictability in cultural markets.
2
  
However, an important observation that is missing from previous studies is that 
cascades will increase with an increase in the number of people visiting aggregator sites. 
None of the previous studies has provided a model or empirical evidence that 
incorporates this hypothesis. This is an important omission as it suggests that the level of 
cascades will be even more important in the future when there is an increase in 
population using the Internet and the likely dependence of this population on aggregators. 
                                                          
1
 This is also true for other types of aggregators. A similar example can be seen in the case of YouTube, 
which highlights its most popular videos: this is presented under the tab “most viewed” on the website. 
2
 In addition, in the context of lab experiments (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Celen and Kariv, 2004) or field 
studies (Cai, Chen and Fang, 2009; Zhang, 2010; Chen, Wang and Xie, 2011), there are several other 
empirical evidences in favor of “winner-takes-all” conclusions; in other words, popularity information 
benefits high-volume products. 
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The present paper provides a simple model that explains how website aggregators 
affect the online traffic of content providers. Although the model is highly simplified, it 
provides deep insight into the manner in which the number of people using aggregators, 
and people’s behaviors affect online traffic.3  Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 
discusses its welfare implications, and Section 4 presents empirical evidence. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
 
2.2. THE MODEL  
2.2.1. EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, I describe my model to explain the manner in which people decide which 
of two news sites to view in an aggregator in which people can see the popularity rank of 
the news sites. The model can be extrapolated to a more general situation in which 
people choose to visit a website or click on certain content in an aggregator. Let us 
suppose that there are two news websites—A and B—that provide news stories on the 
same topic and therefore directly compete with each other.
4
 In other words, websites A 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that the “aggregators” examined in this study differ from what are known as “user 
reviews,” 3 which allow viewers to provide explicit user feedback or recommendations. I categorize the 
online reputation systems into two groups of people: those that provide explicit user feedback or 
recommendations and those that do not. Amazon’s “average customer review” and Yahoo! News’ “most 
recommended” sections are examples of user reviews, whereas Yahoo! News’ “most popular” section is an 
example of the latter group, which is the subject of this study. User reviews can moderate the impact of 
cascades (Duan et al., 2008) as they may provide more accurate information. The purpose of the current 
model is not to identify the relative importance of these two effects or to separate them. 
4
 Websites A and B are of the same design, which means that they belong to the same category of product 
or service, and people search by this category when they use an aggregator. 
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and B fall under the same category within which popularity information is ranked. In this 
paper, following Bar-Isaac et al. (2011), I define “design” as a category within which 
popularity information is ranked. Further, suppose that website A is a “first mover” and 
therefore better known to the public than website B. The decision process of a visitor to 
the aggregator is depicted in the form of a decision tree in Figure 2.1.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Probability of each choice 
 
   
        
            
       
            
                
 
Suppose there is a population of size N who is interested in visiting either website A or 
website B, and initially, a proportion   of the population prefers website A, but the 
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remainder prefers website B. This situation is represented by 
 
 
    , which is 
reflective of the fact that website A enjoys the first mover advantage
5
. 
The model assumes that people do not have information about the cost quality of the 
websites, and they can visit aggregators to view the relative popularity of the two 
websites. Then, one user is selected at random from the entire population N, and he or 
she makes a decision as follows.
6
 With probability  , the individual merely selects the 
article from the website he or she used to visit, but with probability      , the 
individual searches for information to ascertain which website is better in terms of 
quality. Further, suppose there is an aggregator on the Internet that provides information 
on the relative popularity of the two websites.        is the probability that the 
individual visits website A and chooses the website ranked as “the more popular website.” 
As mentioned earlier, probability            represents the individual’s search for 
perfect information on the quality of the two websites, by paying search costs, and his or 
her choice of the website that has the higher utility, with the probability of choosing 
website A equal to  . Therefore,   can be regarded as the relative quality measure of 
website A to website B, under the assumption that people prefer a website with higher 
quality. Thus,   
 
 
 implies that more than half the population prefers website A, the 
first mover, over website B; website A also has a quality advantage. On the other hand, 
                                                          
5
 In some studies (e.g. Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994, Xiao and Benbasat 2011), this first mover advantage 
is called a primary effect, which refers to a scenario in which the first content posted gets the most 
attention simply because they are observed first in the list.  
6
 To maintain the simplicity and tractability of the model, I do not explicitly model the consumers’ 
optimization problem. Instead, I model consumers’ choices with probabilities   and   which, in turn, can 
be expressed as functions of relevant utility parameters. 
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 means that more than half the population prefers website B, the second mover. 
  
 
 
 is a special case where 50 percents of the population prefers A, and the remaining 
50 percents prefers B; in this case, neither website has an advantage. Further, assume that 
consumers’ utility functions are such that   is continuous between 0 and 1. 7  More 
specifically, let    be the quality of website         and    be the utility of person i. 
Then, the relative quality parameter   is defined as follows: 
 
                      
  
  
  
where   
  
  
  is an increasing function of 
  
  
. Here, I define quality as the subjective value 
of the news information, which might be “either personally useful or merely entertaining” 
(Zaller, 2003), and thus do not assume that soft news is necessarily inaccurate or inferior 
(Baum, 2003, 2005; Baum and Jamison, 2006). 
Note that the website selected as the more popular website is not necessarily the one 
with the higher quality, as popularity does not automatically imply quality. In this model, 
I assume that the cost of visiting aggregators and the cost involved in choosing the more 
popular website are lower than the cost of searching for accurate quality information on 
both websites; I also assume that some people will trade accuracy of information for 
lower cost (         Explicit feedback or recommendations provides potential 
customers with quality information on products; therefore, probability        in the 
                                                          
7
 People may have different preferences for the same product. 
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model is related to people’s visits to aggregators without explicit feedback or 
recommendations. 
The decision of the model is sequential. Let    represent the event in which website 
A is selected as the more popular one at the time when the nth person makes his or her 
decision; let     ) represent the expected probability of this event. Further, let us 
suppose that once exposed to a website never previously visited, a person may highly 
appreciate its quality. Let us assume that the preference for one website over another can 
be affected by a person’s experience with either website; there is a chance,  , that people 
can change their preferences when they visit a website they do not like. Then, as seen in 
Figure 1, the expected probabilities of the randomly chosen nth person choosing website 
A or B are as follows: 
 
      =                                                                              (1) 
       =                                                       (2) 
 
where         is the proportion of “website A lovers” when    . Because website A 
initially has the first mover advantage, I assume that 
 
 
      and         . 
Therefore, after the nth individual makes his or her choice, the proportion of website A 
lovers is as follows:  
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                                        (3) 
   
               0 in equilibrium  
 
where          is the probability that the nth player is a website A lover who 
switches to website B;          represents the reverse probability. In this paper, 
equilibrium is defined as the state at which the system of equations and, therefore, all 
variables of interest—     ,      , and        —do not change in n. Because 
              must hold in equilibrium, I am able to ascertain the equilibrium 
proportion of website A lovers,      , as well as the equilibrium probability of a person 
choosing website A,      : 
 
                   
   
                                                        (4) 
 
 
 
where    
   
         denotes the value of         in equilibrium, and k is the value of n 
in equilibrium. From the equilibrium condition in Equation (4),
8
 we see that equilibrium 
      and       depend on the value of    
   
        , which can be either 1 or 0 when 
                                                          
8
 The meaning of the number n will depend on how often the aggregator updates its ranking. For example, 
if Yahoo! News provides a weekly “most viewed news” ranking, then parameter n will refer to the number 
of clicks or unique visitors generated within the span of one week. 
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 holds. This is explained in Appendix B. Let    be the “cutoff” quality parameter, 
which is defined as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 1: The cutoff quality parameter    represents the value of quality 
parameter  , which satisfies the following property: 
 
   
   
         
      
      
  
 
where      
 
 
 holds. 
 
I then obtain the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: The equilibrium proportion of website A lovers,      , and the 
equilibrium probability that a person will choose website A,      , are as follows:  
 
                   
   
            
(5) 
   
     Quality         Cascade   
 
Equilibrium       and       has two components. In other words, people choose 
website A over website B for either of two reasons: website A is relatively better than 
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website B in terms of quality (“quality”), or website A is selected as the more popular 
site by the aggregator (“cascade”).  
  
FIGURE 2.2: Equilibrium      ,      , and        
 
I.      
 
 
II.      
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Combining Equation 5 with Definition 1 yields the following equation: 
 
             
           
         
  
 
2.2.2  COMPARATIVE STATIC 
Since equilibrium       and       depend on whether   is greater or less than the 
cutoff,   , the model implication is greatly affected by   . Proposition 2 shows how cutoff 
   is affected by various model parameters.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: The cutoff,   , decreases, and therefore, the probability of there 
being a positive first mover advantage increases  
( ) as consumer brand loyalty increases (i.e., an increase in  ). 
( ) as consumers rely more on aggregators (i.e., an increase in  ). 
( ) in the initial share of consumers who prefer the first mover (i.e., an increase in   ). 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
 
2.2.3. CASCADING EFFECT  
It is often believed that if a product is of higher quality, this product will benefit from the 
Internet because with lower switching costs (Porter, 2001; Athey et al, 2011), the 
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consumer will naturally gravitate toward the higher-quality choice. However, in the case 
of aggregators, there is no guarantee that the one with the quality advantage will benefit 
from the Internet. People will try to save search costs by using aggregators, but this 
saving comes at the expense of less accurate information on quality. In this chapter, I 
define “cascade” as the difference between what consumers actually chose and what they 
would have chosen if they had perfect information on quality. Then, I show how cascade 
on the Internet increases with an increase in the number of visitors to aggregators. It is 
also important to note that cascade will be maximized in an absolute value if the qualities 
of competing products are similar. Intuitively, when there is a large difference in quality, 
most people will choose the option with higher quality, and aggregators will also pick the 
higher quality one as the more popular choice. However, if there is a minimal quality 
difference, consumers’ preferences will be divided almost equally for the two products, 
and aggregators will be likely to rank the two products and pick only one; however, this 
could mean that the selected product could be the one with the slightly lower quality if it 
was the first mover.   
For a formal representation of these implications, let me define the cascading effect, 
  . 
 
DEFINITION 2: Cascading effect    is defined as follows: 
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In the absence of aggregators, people would have chosen website A with probability   in 
equilibrium. Thus, cascading effect    is the difference between the equilibrium 
probability of a person choosing website A and the relative quality of website A. 
Therefore,    represents the magnitude of cascades on the Internet. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 2: The magnitude of cascade    
( ) increases in absolute value as the number of Internet users, n, increases. 
( ) is positive if     , and negative if     .  
( ) is always positive if   
 
 
 (if neither A nor B has a quality advantage, then the first 
mover will benefit from aggregators). 
( ) is maximized when   is just above cutoff   , and minimized when   is just below 
cutoff   .  
( ) is a function of the relative quality advantage of the first mover   and people’s 
behavior   (i.e., the tendency to use an aggregator).  
 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
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2.3. WELFARE IMPLICATION  
In this section, I examine the welfare implication of using an aggregator. In order to keep 
the model as simple as possible while maintaining key implications, I assume    . Let 
us suppose that the population can be divided into two types: types   and  . Type   
represents people who prefer website A over B, and type   represents those who prefer 
website B over A. From the entire population, the proportion of type   is  , and that of 
type   is    . Since people do not have perfect information about quality, the type   
and type   population can represent those who prefer website B and website A, 
respectively. The decision of the model is sequential, and the nth player is randomly 
chosen from the population. Then, in equilibrium, the following lemma must hold.  
 
LEMMA 2: Let   
  and     
   be       and      , respectively, for each type   
     . Then, in equilibrium, we have the following: 
 
  
      
                
  
      
            
 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
 
Let   
  and   
  be the utilities of consuming websites A and B, respectively, for each type 
       , where   
    
  and   
    
  hold by definition. A person pays a search cost 
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of    when using an aggregator, and a search cost of    when searching for perfect 
information on the two websites. The expected search cost for any player is   
                     . Thus, assuming       (i.e., using an aggregator saves 
search cost), the expected utility becomes a linear equation in   as follows: 
 
          
               
    
                  
    
  
             
   
 
where       
         
          is the equilibrium expected utility in the 
absence of aggregators. Thus, the marginal benefit of using an aggregator is as follows: 
 
      
  
  
        
    
                              
    
    
                              
  
  
 
  
 Imperfect information 
 
Search cost reduction  
 
The marginal utility of using an aggregator, 
      
  
, can be either positive or negative 
depending on the relative magnitude of the following two components: (1) imperfect 
information and (2) search cost reduction. Imperfect information is negative or zero, and 
search cost reduction is always positive. Therefore, the use of an aggregator necessarily 
involves a tradeoff in expected utility; although a person can save on search costs by 
61 
 
using an aggregator, the resulting quality of the received information is no better than it 
would otherwise be with a full information search. This result is further analyzed in 
Proposition 3.  
 
PROPOSITION 3 The use of an aggregator necessarily involves a tradeoff in expected 
utility; search cost saving comes at the expense of imperfect information. Assuming 
  
    
    
    
   , the marginal utility of using an aggregator is minimized when 
      9  and maximized when   is either 1 or 0, when   is a sufficiently small 
number.  
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 3 has an important implication because it suggests that the use of an 
aggregator may not always be welfare enhancing. For example, if either   
    
  or 
  
    
  is sufficiently large in its absolute value, the disutility from imperfect 
information may be greater than the utility from search cost saving. In this case, the 
marginal utility of using an aggregator may become negative.  
Proposition 3 also suggests that the social welfare implications of aggregators greatly 
depend on the relative quality of the competing products. This result suggests that 
aggregators are more likely to be welfare enhancing in a market in which people have 
similar opinions about the quality of competing products, (i.e.,   is either 0 or 1); 
                                                          
9
 The value of 
      
  
 at        is greater than that at       .  
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contrarily, aggregators are less likely to be welfare enhancing when people have 
heterogeneous tastes.  
 
FIGURE 2.3: Graphical illustration of Proposition 3 
 
I. Number of Internet Users vs. Cascading effect 
 
 
 
II. First Mover’s Relative Quality Advantage vs. Cascading effect 
 
 
63 
 
Proposition 3 also provides insight into the manner in which aggregators should set 
the scope of their popularity information in order to minimize their social costs. Social 
costs resulting from imperfect information are minimized when the range of products that 
are under the same umbrella of popularity ranking is as narrow as possible. If aggregators 
provide a popularity ranking by comparing somewhat heterogeneous products, then 
people are more likely to have heterogeneous tastes over the competing products (i.e.,   
is less likely to be either 0 or 1). In this case, the ranking provided by aggregators cannot 
mislead a significant number of people.  
 
2.4.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the model, the key variable that drives the cascading effect is        , the probability 
that the first mover will be selected as the most popular website.  Thus, instead of 
looking at the magnitude of cascade, I propose an empirical test of        . The key 
feature of         is that it increases with the number of Internet users, n, when      
holds, and decreases with n when      holds. But as   and    are not directly 
observable, it is not straightforward to implement an empirical test. Furthermore, having 
more than two competing websites in a market makes an empirical test of the model even 
more challenging. However, if I restrict our attention to a market where the first mover 
enjoys the highest market share, it is reasonable to believe that      should hold in this 
market (i.e., the quality of information from news organization that enjoys the greatest 
market share is at least as good as the quality of other news information.). Therefore, in 
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this market, ceteris paribus, the probability that the first mover will be selected as the 
most popular website should increase with the number of visitors to the site providing the 
ranking.  
In this section, I present an empirical test of the key features of         , using 
online news traffic data from Naver, a South Korean web portal, which is the world’s 
fifth
10
 largest search service provider, behind Google, Yahoo, Baidu and Microsoft, and 
has dominated the Korean search market
11
. There are two reasons I rely on Naver as the 
data source. The most important reason is that Naver has publicly maintained in its 
website
12
 a historical dataset of “the most popular news stories” since mid-2000s. This 
public dataset is valuable, as other international major information aggregators such as 
Yahoo!, Google, and AOL have not publicly released or maintained a historical dataset 
of its kind. Second, Korea is one of the five countries in the world that had the highest 
broadband penetration as of June 2007 (OECD 2008). This gives us a large variation in 
our independent variable and a more credible estimate of the effect of interest.  
Thus my empirical strategy aims to verify that the probability that the first mover 
will be selected as the most popular website, and thus the magnitude of cascade, increase 
as the number of visitors to the aggregator site increases. (i.e. 
      
  
   holds if       
holds). Thus, the empirical specification is:  
 
                                                          
10
 The Associated Press, 9 Oct 2007 
11
 As of December 2010, www.naver.com is ranked 53rd in "the 1000 most-visited sites on the web 
(worldwide)" by Google. (See http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top1000). 
12
 http://news.naver.com/main/ranking/popularWeek.nhn. 
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                                                  (9) 
 
where           is the weekly probability that the first mover will be selected as the 
most popular news in section i, at time t, which I use as a proxy for       in the model. 
Naver selects 30 news stories each week as the most popular news in each section i, and 
thus           is the total number of news stories supplied by the first mover selected 
as the most popular news at time t out of the top 30.      is the weekly number of unique 
visitors to the Naver website.       is a proxy for the relative quality variable   in the 
model, using the weekly number of “direct” traffic13 to the first mover relative to the 
“direct” traffic to all news organizations supplying news stories to Naver combined. 
“Direct” traffic refers to the online traffic that is not referred by any other websites (e.g., 
when a person types www.nytimes.com directly into the web address bar and visits the 
New York Times website). I use the relative “direct” traffic to the first mover as a proxy 
for the variable   in the model as I assume, as in Chapter 1, that direct traffic must reveal 
people’s true preferences based on their private signals concerning the quality. The 
function      reflects overall time trends in the dependent variable, which I either 
parameterize using a linear or a quadratic polynomial or rely on nonparametric functional 
form by including dummy variables. I expect that the coefficient of interest,   , is 
positive as the model indicates that 
      
  
   holds if       holds.  
                                                          
13
 I also use (1) the asset size of the first mover company relative to the asset sizes of all Korean newspaper 
companies combined, (2) relative number of employees and (3) relative operating profits instead relative 
“direct" online traffic.” The estimates were all very similar, so I just report the results with the relative 
“direct" online traffic.  
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Then how can we identify the first mover? In this case, I consider the Yonhap news 
agency in Korea to be the first mover. A news agency is an organization of journalists 
that supplies news reports to newspaper companies and Yonhap is the single news 
agency in Korea. Yonhap is the first mover because a news agency can set the agenda 
and release its news faster than other newspaper companies, as many newspaper 
companies reproduce news provided by the agency. Furthermore, as can be seen in 
Appendix B, Naver has reserved a separate “breaking news” section only for Yonhap in 
its main webpage, providing Yonhap with the status of first mover.   
 
FIGURE 2.4: Online Screen Shot of Naver (www.naver.com) 
 
Naver has reserved a separate "breaking news" section only for Yonhap news, which 
provides Yonhap with a first-mover advantage.  
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Thus, following a certain event, news from Yonhap tends to show up faster on the 
Naver website, and therefore is more likely to be selected as the daily most popular news 
relative to news from other news companies. Once it shows up in the daily most popular 
news, it will receive even greater attention and is more likely to be selected as the weekly 
most popular news.
14
 This first move advantage will increase in the number of people 
visiting Naver as Proposition 2 suggests (i.e. coefficient    will be positive).  
As will be explained in the data section, Naver has categorized its historical data of 
the weekly most popular news by several common themes, which they call “sections”. In 
total, there are eight sections
15
: politics, business, society, culture, science, world, sports, 
and entertainment. Using data classified into sections has several advantages. First, the 
number
16
 and kind of newspapers providing news articles to Naver differs for each 
section. This is because there are newspaper companies which specialize in particular 
areas such as sports, entertainment, business, and world news. Second, people's 
preferences might be different for news in different sections. For instance, consumers 
may feel that speed is crucial for news on the business, but they may feel less so for 
world news. By using data classified into different sections and using the section fixed 
                                                          
14
 This has been confirmed by an interview with a manager of the media relation team at Naver. 
15 For the empirical test, I will restrict our attention to six out of eight sections. These are the sections in 
which Yonhap, the first mover, has had the highest probability of being selected as the most popular news 
on average, and therefore I believe      is a reasonable assumption. The other two sections are sports 
and entertainment news. In the sports and entertainment sections, Yonhap did not belong to one of the top 
online news companies. Given the fact that there are a significant number of online news companies 
specializing in sports and entertainment, I cannot tell with confidence whether      or      holds in 
those sections. This makes it difficult to draw a clear prediction from the model. Therefore, I exclude those 
two sections from our analysis.  
16
 For each section, the list of newspaper companies providing news to Naver has been stable over time 
except for the sports section. In the sports section, there have been several online news companies 
specializing in either baseball or soccer, and some of them have provided news only during the seasons of 
their respective coverage areas. 
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effect, I can control for these heterogeneities across sections that might otherwise bias 
our regression estimates.   
Table 2.1 reports the estimates of Equation (9). Taken altogether, the number of 
visitors to Naver is positively associated with the probability that news from Yonhap is 
selected as the weekly most popular news; a one standard deviation increase, which is a 
1.5 million increase, in the weekly number of visitors to Naver is associated with about a 
3.8 percentages point increase in the probability of being selected as “most popular”. 
This positive association is also obvious in Figure 2.5, which show scatter-plots between 
the two variables in different sections.  
 
  
 
6
9
 
TABLE 2.1 : The effect of online traffic on the prob. of the first mover being ranked as a top news in a news aggregator 
 
 Dependent variable: TOPNEWS (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
UV (in millions) 1.973
**
 1.989
**
 1.848
**
 2.479
**
 2.043
**
 2.539
**
 
 (0.209) (0.172) (0.212) (0.393) (0.590) (0.760) 
       
QUAL   1.504
*
 2.070
**
 2.288
**
 1.355 
   (0.787) (0.660) (0.686) (2.222) 
       
Time    -0.015* 0.015  
    (0.009) (0.031)  
       
Time squared     -0.000  
     (0.000)  
       
Section fixed effect           
Linear time trend        
Quadratic time trend        
Nonparametric time trend        
Number of Obs. 1,557 1,557 1,557 1,557 1,557 1,557 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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FIGURE 2.5 : Scatter-plots: Online traffic to a news aggregator site vs. Prob. of the first mover being ranked as a top news  
2.5.1. Politics News Section 
 
2.5.2. Business News Section 
 
2.5.3. World News Section 
 
   
2.5.4. Society Section 
 
2.5.5. Science News Section 
 
2.5.6. Culture News Section 
 
 
Note: 1. The horizontal axis: the number of unique visitors to the Naver  website (unit: million).  
2. The vertical axis: the probability that news articles supplied by the Yonhap news agency (the first mover) will be selected as the most 
popular news of the week.  
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2.5. CONCLUSION & LIMITATIONS 
In this study, I have put forth a simple model of aggregators; there are, though, several 
limitations to this model. One of the aspects not addressed by the model is the entry and 
exit of suppliers (for example, the entry of new content providers other than websites A 
and B). Although the entry and exit of suppliers are important phenomena, the 
implications of the model are not significantly affected by their omission, especially 
because the model deals with competition within each design. The results of the model 
suggest that cascades tend to benefit the first mover within each design, thereby implying 
that the existence of aggregators will provide suppliers with the incentive to develop 
newer designs, becoming the first movers of these. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Bar-Isaac et al. (2011).  
Another aspect that the model did not incorporate is consumers’ endogenous decision 
to use aggregators. In this study, the consumers’ decision on whether to stick to their 
preferences or use the aggregator is randomized with exogenous probabilities   and  . 
There are two reasons why consumers’ decisions are not modeled as endogenous. First, it 
is not clear whether people visit aggregator sites as a result of rational decision making. 
Many people may choose to visit Google News or Yahoo! News for behavioral reasons 
such as inertia, as opposed to rational processes. Second, incorporating consumers’ 
endogenous decisions into the model produces the same implication, but the model 
becomes less tractable when the number of visitors to aggregator, n, is greater than two. 
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Although the current model is a highly reduced-form model, it provides better insight 
into the manner in which equilibrium online traffic reaches an equilibrium state.  
Let me outline two future directions for the current study. (1) This paper has put forth 
a highly simplified model that explains how people’s choices of clicks are affected by 
aggregators. The model can be further developed in a number of ways, such as modeling 
demand side utility function, expanding the number of suppliers, and incorporating their 
strategic interactions. (2) The model has important implications and applications that 
extend beyond the context of this paper. Despite the growing influence of the Internet, 
relatively few studies have examined how the Internet influences choices among 
consumers and competition between producers. The framework proposed in this study 
can be extrapolated to political science, marketing, media economics, and other fields, 
and can be extended to answer a wide range of questions related to how people adopt 
new information on the Internet. 
Coming back to the political implications of the Internet, the finding of this study 
implies that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the negative impact of the Internet on the 
diversity of information consumption may increase as the number of Internet users 
increases. This is because the magnitude of the cascade in an online gatekeeper such as a 
news aggregator may increase, ceteris paribus, in the number of people visiting the 
online gatekeeper.   
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2.6. APPENDIX  
APPENDIX 2.A : Proofs  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
( ) From Appendix B, we know that         can converge to either 1 or 0. If         
converges to 1, which means that         increases in n, then       and therefore    
will also increase in n.  Similarly, if         converges to 0, which means that         
decreases in n, then       and therefore    will also decrease in n.  In the latter case,    
will decreases and converges to a negative value of    , as shown below. This means 
that    increases in absolute value in both cases.  
( ) From Proposition 3,    takes following values in equilibrium. With        , 
   is positive if     , and negative if     . This tells us that if the relative quality 
level of the first mover is above a certain cutoff,   , then the first mover benefits from 
expansion of the Internet due to aggregators. However, if the quality of the first mover is 
below the threshold, then the first mover will lose its customers more quickly with the 
Internet than without it. 
 
    
                       
                             
  
 
( ) This immediately follows from Proposition A2 in Appendix A. 
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( )    is maximized when      and minimized when        with a small number 
 .  
( ) This immediately follows from Definition 2 and Proposition 1.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
In equilibrium, Equation (5) must hold separately for type   and type  , with the 
parameter   in Equation (5) redefined as 1 for type   and as 0 for type  . A simple 
algebra gives us the lemma. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Suppose that         stays stable at a number between zero and one for          , 
if      holds, where u is a sufficiently large integer and   is either an integer or a 
positive infinity.  For       to be stable with          , we should have       
        
 
 
  (see Appendix B for further details), and Equation (3) becomes the 
following for          : 
 
       
 
 
                 
 
where                 represents the right hand side of Equation (3). Then assuming   
is a well-behaved function at     , we may write: 
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where   is a function defined so that  
 
 
                          . By the implicit 
function theorem, we have: 
 
   
  
    
     
      
   
   
  
   
     
      
   
   
   
   
      
      
   
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The marginal benefit of using an aggregator is a piece-wise linear function of   with a 
breakpoint at     . A simple algebra shows that it is maximized when   is either 1 or 0, 
and minimized when       . 
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APPENDIX 2.B : Aggregators 
In equilibrium, both      , and      , depends on         which drives cascades in 
the model. The probability that website A will be selected as the most popular news, 
       , is the probability that the number of successes is greater than 
 
 
 in a Poisson 
binomial distribution with success probabilities                 . Formally, we 
consider the sum    of             independent Bernoulli random variables 
         with success probabilities,               .  Then, we have 
 
            
 
 
  
 
As the distribution     of    has a complicated structure, it is often approximated by 
other distributions. In this paper, I approximate
17
     by a binomial distribution       
with number of trials n and success probability    
   
 
   
 
.  Then,         is the 
probability that the number of success from        is greater than or equal to  
   
 
. We 
thus have: 
 
                                                          
17
 For the binomial approximation to the Poisson binomial, see Ehm (1991). But note that we are not much 
concerned about the accuracy of the approximation of         because we are interested only in the 
direction of its convergence and not in the rate of its convergence. 
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With the approximation, it is easy to see that         converges to one of three values: 
1, 
 
 
, or 0.  
   
   
        
 
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
               
 
 
  
 
The convergence of         is more obvious if we approximate        by a normal 
distribution as follows.  
 
                         
 
   
       
  (A1) 
 
where   
   
   
   
   
 and Z is a standard score. However, as p is a variable that depends on 
other parameters, it is important to check the conditions under which p converges to  
 
 
 
and therefore         converges to 
 
 
.  To begin with, let us find conditions under which 
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we have               for sufficiently large integers u and v.                
implies that we have  
 
            
 
   
       
   
 
   
       
   (A2) 
 
where    is a standard score when    .  For (A2) to hold with sufficiently large 
integers u and v, we should have   
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 where u and v are sufficiently 
large numbers. In this case, it is required that we have         
 
 
   To see this 
through contradiction, suppose that we have            
 
 
 , and  
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
. Then we have: 
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
     
 
   
  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Therefore, for the system to be stable for           where u and v are sufficiently 
large integers, we should have the following two conditions met.  
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 (Condition 1) 
        
 
 
 (Condition 2) 
 
 79 
 
However, these two conditions do not guarantee               
 
 
.  It is possible that 
        stays stable at a number between zero and one for          , then diverges 
again to either one or zero, as shown in Figure A1.  This suggests that a “tipping point”, 
where a stable         suddenly starts to increase, exists if   is close to   .  
 
FIGURE A1: An Example of Temporarily Stable System 
 
 
Now let us find conditions, required in addition to (Condition 1) and (Condition 2), under 
which we have               
 
 
. To make our analysis tractable, suppose that     
holds.
18
  In this case, from Equations (1) and (7), notice that          holds for    .  
 
                                            
 
                                                          
18
 However, the same analysis holds for a general case of      . 
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Thus Equation (1) becomes:  
 
                                   
 
Now let us define initial parameters   ,  , and  ,  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
     and          
 
 
  
 
We then have    
 
 
  .  Then define a function       as follows: 
 
      
 
 
       
            
 
 
        
 
    
         
  
 
 
 for     
 
where    
   
 
   
 
.  It is important to note that         holds if       To see this, it 
is obvious that          if and only if    , because we have    
 
 
  .  Given this, 
we have          if and only if    . Iterating this process, we know that          
holds if and only if    .  Now let us express    and    as functions of k and      .  
 
   
 
 
    
   
 
 
                         
   
   
 for     
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Thus, to have               
 
 
, we should have    
 
 
 which holds if and only if 
   .  To see that     is a necessary and sufficient condition, first notice that    is a 
weighted average of       , and        . Then note that         is greater than 
 
 
  as 
long as    
 
 
 for any      .  By contradiction, suppose that     and    
 
 
 
holds. Starting from    ,    
 
 
 holds as    
 
 
 and       
 
 
. Then,    
 
 
 holds as 
   
 
 
 and       
 
 
.  Iterating this process, we have    
 
 
 for any n, which obviously 
contradicts    
 
 
. The same logic applies to    , and therefore if    
 
 
, then    .  
 
The analysis so far has shown that we should have     and therefore       
 
 
.  
The same analysis applies to    and  , from which we get             
 
 
. 
Then, it is easy to show 
 
                
 
 
 (Condition 3) 
 
In addition, the equilibrium condition in Equation (8) should also hold. With 
              
 
 
 and (Condition 3), the Equation (8) becomes: 
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       (Condition 4) 
 
PROPOSITION A1: Taken altogether, we have  
   
   
        
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
 
 
 
                             
                                           
 
 
  
 
 
Proposition A1 can be extended to Proposition A2. 
 
PROPOSITION A2 : Under mild assumptions on the values of  ,  , and  
 
 
 
 
,  
   
   
           holds when   
 
 
  and    
   
           holds when    .  
PROOF:  
Suppose   
 
 
,  meaning the first mover is also better in terms of quality. To see that 
        is increasing with n, and    
   
           holds, let me first define a 
cumulative binomial function,     , where the number of successes is greater than one 
half of the number of total trials
19
.  
 
                                                          
19
 If the number of trials is an even number and we have equal number of successes and failures, I assume 
that the event      happens with probability 
 
 
. 
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     can be considered the probability that website A will show up as “the more popular 
website”.  This is for the case when website A is chosen more than half the time from a 
binomial distribution of     trials with success probability  . But as         
 
 
  
holds, it is easy to see that     
   
       holds for any n.       goes to 1 as n 
increases
20
, and so does         .   
Then suppose that    . Under mild assumptions on parameters (i.e., if   and   are 
not too large), then we have    
   
          .  The proof for the case when   
 
 
  
follows from Proposition A.1; if neither the first mover nor the second has an advantage 
in quality, i.e.,   
 
 
, then         goes to 1 as n goes to infinity, as long as    
 
 
  
holds. The fact that    
   
         can only be either 1 or 0 suggests there is a "cutoff"   
between 0 and  
 
 
, which is defined in Definition 1.  
 
                                                          
20 For an intuitive explanation, suppose that 51% of the whole population is "website A lovers" and that 
randomly chosen individuals always choose their preferred website. In this case, if the more popular 
website is selected based on the choice made by one randomly selected person, then website A will have a 
51% chance to be selected. However, if the more popular website is selected based on the choice made by 
a large population, for example several million, then website A will almost always be chosen by more than 
half of the population and be selected as "the more popular website".  
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Appendix 2.C: DATA 
The dependent variable comes from Naver's public dataset of “the most popular news,” 
which is compiled both daily and weekly. Daily data has been archived since April 2004, 
and weekly data since June 2005. I use weekly ranking data because they are more 
comparable with my weekly independent variable. The dataset has ranked the top thirty 
most viewed news every week since June 2005, with the cutoff for the ranking every 
Friday at midnight. Naver's weekly ranking is collected separately for eight different 
sections: politics, business, social, cultural, world, science, sports, and entertainment. I 
leave out the sports and entertainment news sections as the theoretical model does not 
have any clear prediction for them. Data is all publicly available for replication and detail 
information on the data is as follows. 
Variables Type Coverage Data Source 
Unique visitors to Naver Weekly 
June 2005 - 
June 2010 
Nielson Korea 
(http://www.koreanclick.c
om) 
“Direct” traffic to Yonhap 
relative to the “direct” traffic to 
all news organizations supplying 
news stories to Naver combined. 
Weekly 
June 2005 - 
June 2010 
Nielson Korea 
(http://www.koreanclick.c
om), and Naver
21
  
Naver's most viewed news Weekly 
June 2005 - 
June 2010 
Naver
22
 
Asset size of newspaper 
companies 
Yearly 2005 - 2010 
Media Statistics 
Information System 
(http://mediasis.kpf.or.kr/) 
 
                                                          
21
 For the period after December 2008, the “direct” traffic for each site is obtained by removing the traffic 
referred by Naver from the total online traffic for each site.  
22
 http://news.naver.com/main/ranking/popularWeek.nhn 
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CHAPTER 3:  
COMPARISONS OF VARIOUS ONLINE INSTITUTIONS: 
INFORMATION CONSUMPTION ON SOCIAL MEDIA  
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, the Internet is a major source for people to obtain new political information. 
According to a survey conducted by Pew Internet (2010), the Internet has surpassed 
newspapers in terms of popularity as a news platform by a substantial margin, and 
ranks behind only television. Further, the Pew Internet survey summarizes that 
“peoples’ relationship to news is becoming portable and participatory.” The survey 
found that 33% of mobile phone owners read newspapers on their mobile phones, and 
37% of Internet users disseminate news content via postings on social media sites 
such as Facebook or Twitter. The rapidly growing number of people that use mobile 
technologies to read news online (Pew Internet, 2010) suggests that news 
organizations will have to increase their use of social media to attract attention 
online,
1
 In response to the changing business environment, many media 
organizations have adopted social media to drive traffic to their websites (Messner et 
al., 2011).
2
 For instance, The New York Times describes its social media marketing as 
“one of the several essential strategies for disseminating news online” (Emmett, 
2009). 
                                                          
1
 Recent evidence implies that people who read newspapers on their mobile phones tend to be more 
active users of social media sites and read or share news stories more frequently using those sites (Pew 
Internet, 2009). Rupert Murdoch, News Corp’s chief executive has referred to mobile technologies as a 
“game-changer” for news consumption (Reuters, Nov. 12, 2010).  
2
 See Table 3.1. 
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TABLE 3.1: Newspapers' social media adoption 
Facebook (%) 
A
 
Facebook 
Supporters
  
B
 
Twitter (%) 
C
 
Twitter 
Supporters
  
D
 
Tweets Per 
Week
  
E
 
82.6 10,591 84.7 22,070 116 
 
A
  The percentage that had a Facebook account in January, 2011 
B
  Average number of people who said that they liked the Facebook page as of January, 2011 
C
  The percentage that had a Twitter account in January, 2011 
D
  Average number of followers as of January, 2011 
E
  Average number of tweets sent per week since adoption as of January, 2011 
 
Despite the rapidly growing use of social media in the newspaper industry, thus 
far, very few studies have discussed the impact of social media on the diversity of 
information in the context of online news. Thus, an important question is whether, 
and to what extent, adoptions of social media tools have a potential to have different 
impacts on the diversity of online information than other online institutions such as 
search engines or news aggregators have. There are at least two reasons why the 
online attention generated by social media sites might differ from that generated by 
search engines or news aggregators.
3
 (1) Social media sites generally do not rank 
online news stories. Search engines or news aggregators create cascades
4
 because 
they rank information depending on certain measures of “popularity” (Duan et al., 
2008); information with a higher rank is more visible to users and has an even higher 
probability of getting online clicks.
5
 (2) Social media sites provide a platform for 
                                                          
3
 See Chiou and Tucker (2010) for empirical evidence of the impact of news aggregators on the 
number of visitors to newspaper sites.  
4
 A cascade (information cascade, in this case) arises when people who have imperfect information 
about true product value infer value by observing the choices of others (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani 
et al., 1992). 
5
 See Salganik et al. (2006) and Tucker and Zhang (2011) for evidence on the impact of popularity 
information. 
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organizations to reach out to their audiences. For example, before the advent of social 
media tools, news organizations would post their news stories on their websites and 
depend on search engines or aggregators to direct online traffic to them. Now, news 
organizations make use of social media tools to actively disseminate news: these tools 
ensure that news reaches all the networks
6
 that expressed an interest in the news, 
regardless of whether search engines or aggregators pay attention to that news. The 
above two differences suggest that the online attention generated by social media sites 
might be more egalitarian than that generated by other online institutions.  
 
3.2.  DATA 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the association between social media 
adoptions and online news readership. I conducted two empirical analyses. The first is 
a test of the association between online traffic to newspaper sites and the news 
organizations’ adoption of Twitter. The second is a comparison of the online traffic 
generated by different online institutions: search engines, news aggregators, and 
social media. The following subsections explain how the data set for each empirical 
analysis is constructed. Summary statistics of all variables can be found in Table 3.2.  
 
3.2.1.  ONLINE TRAFFIC  
This paper uses online traffic as a proxy for the online attention or readership. Among 
the various measures of online traffic, I used the measure involving the number of 
                                                          
6
 The concepts of “friends” on Facebook and “followers” on Twitter. 
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unique visitors. I compiled monthly online traffic data sets for 337 daily newspapers, 
from January 2007 to December 2010. Monthly online traffic data for 2007 were 
obtained from ComScore, Inc, and the data for the later periods were purchased from 
Compete, Inc., and the data from two different sources were appended.
7
 The studied 
sample of newspapers (337) includes almost all the major newspapers in the US, 
except for community newspapers and those without websites.
8
 The earliest adopters 
joined Twitter in March 2007. Therefore, my observation included the time before 
(from January to March 2007) and after Twitter adoption for all the newspapers in the 
sample. 
 
TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     (Log-transformed) 12.0 1.3 4.7 17.1 
Direct traffic 17,216 52,603 529 1,488,239 
Social media traffic 31,664 84,790 726 1,469,476 
Search traffic 117,376 334,915 955 3,728,630 
Aggregators traffic 23,700 59,858 249 787,092 
Number of Twitter followers 22,070 228,414 0 3,809,821 
Number of tweets 12,310 12,531 0 94,198 
Number of months passed since Twitter 
adoption at the time of January, 2011 
24 13 0 49 
 
 Note: “Number of months passed since Twitter adoption at the time of January, 2011” is the 
maximum value of         in equation (1) for each newspaper.  
                                                          
7
 Monthly online traffic data set was obtained from two different sources as the data from Compete, 
Inc. was not available for 2007   
8
 I excluded from the analysis the newspapers for which the unique visitor information could not be 
identified. For example, some newspapers in Michigan were excluded because they share a website 
(www.mlive.com) and do not maintain individual ones. 
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The monthly online traffic data can be disaggregated into the following five sub-
categories based on the sites people visit prior to visiting the newspaper website: 
direct traffic, search traffic, aggregators’ traffic, social media traffic, and others. As 
explained in Chapter 1, Direct traffic refers to online traffic that is not referred by any 
other websites. For instance, if you directly visit the New York Times website by 
typing www.nytimes.com into the web address bar, then this type of traffic will be 
classified under direct traffic. Search traffic, aggregators’ traffic, and social media 
traffic are also defined as in Chapter 1; they refer to online traffic that is referred by 
search engines, news aggregators, and social media websites, respectively. Social 
media sites with the largest share of traffic include Facebook and Twitter. 
As in Chapter 1, when classifying sub-categories, I paid special attention to the 
search traffic and direct traffic categories, and I had to reclassify some of the search 
traffic as direct traffic. For example, if you type in the name of a newspaper on the 
Google search engine bar, even though you will be directed straight to that 
newspaper’s website, this action will be classified under search traffic, although, in 
reality, it is no different from direct traffic. Therefore, I collected data on the 
keywords used by people to search for newspaper websites. If the keywords 
constituted variants of the name of a newspaper, such as “new york times,” “nytimes,” 
or “nyt,” I reclassified that traffic from search traffic to direct traffic. 
 
3.2.2.  TWITTER ADOPTION AND THE NUMBER OF “FOLLOWERS”  
In order to test whether newspaper sites' sign up for Twitter has been positively 
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associated with their online readership, I compiled a data set of the number of 
followers, the number of messages (“tweets”) created on Twitter, and Twitter joining 
dates for the 337 sample newspapers. The number of followers and the number of 
messages were collected manually from each newspaper's Twitter account during the 
last week of January in 2011, and Twitter joining dates were collected using an online 
application of “when did you join Twitter? ”9  
 
3.3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. NEWSPAPERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ADOPTION AND ONLINE READERSHIP 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the association between social media 
adoptions and online readerships in online news industry, I present a case study of 
Twitter. In addition to the association between the two variables, I also discuss how 
the association depends on the size of the newspapers’ networks and the number of 
messages posted on Twitter.  
Twitter
10
 is a particularly interesting networking site because it adopts the 
“asymmetric model” of relationships (Porter, 2009). Unlike other social media sites 
like Facebook—where two users can view each other’s posts, provided they mutually 
agree to exchange information—Twitter enables news organizations to maintain an 
“asymmetric” position by following only a few chosen accounts, all the while being 
followed by several million users worldwide (Porter, 2009). This asymmetry makes 
                                                          
9
 www.whendidyoujointwitter.com 
10
 Twitter is a social networking, blogging, and texting platform (Messner et al., 2011) where users can 
post messages called “tweets,” in under 140 characters, to their audience, referred to as their 
“followers.” Twitter users can choose who they want to follow. 
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Twitter an attractive tool by which news organizations can disseminate news. Farhi 
(2009) observes the growing importance of Twitter, noting that “its speed and brevity 
make it ideal for pushing out scoops and breaking news to Twitter-savvy readers.” 
This paper uses the data for 337 daily newspapers from January 2007 to 
December 2010 for the empirical test. Specifically, I ran the following regressions.  
(1)                                
(2)                                                    
 
The dependent variable      represents the online traffic measured by the log 
transformed number of unique visitors to a newspaper site i.      is logarithmically 
transformed to interpret the estimated coefficients in terms of a percentage change. 
The variable         measures the number of months since newspaper i adopted 
Twitter. I impose a linear parametric assumption on        ; If the newspaper has 
not adopted Twitter,         equals zero, and thus,         is an integer greater 
than or equal to zero. The variable            is the size of networks on Twitter 
(the number of “Twitter followers”). I include the newspapers fixed effect,   , and 
control for a nonparametric time trend     . Coefficient    represents the estimated 
impact of the adoption of Twitter on the online readership of newspaper site i, while 
coefficient    represents an interaction effect between         and           . 
The main effect of            is dropped because of the newspapers fixed effect, 
  . 
I also tested equation (2) using the number of messages created on Twitter (the 
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number of “tweets”) in place of the variable           . Although the two variables, 
the number of “tweets” and followers, are significantly related11, they have an 
important difference in that the number of “tweets” can be controlled by the Twitter 
account user while the number of followers cannot. In other words, the more 
significant the association between the number of “tweets” and online traffic, the 
greater the potential for news organizations to reach out to their audiences online. 
However, it is indeed difficult to disentangle the impacts that the two variables have 
on online traffic, and this paper does not aim to do so. Rather it presents descriptive 
associations between the variables.  
 
3.3.2.  COMPARISON OF ONLINE TRAFFIC GENERATED BY DIFFERENT ONLINE 
INSTITUTIONS 
The results estimated with equations (1) and (2) provide an estimated associations 
between newspapers' Twitter adoptions and their online readerships. Although these 
results provide an empirical evidence of Twitter adoptions in online news industry, an 
important question remains; is the estimated association above any different from the 
associations between other online institutions and online attention? In fact, there have 
been some theoretical models (Athey et al. 2011; George and Hogendorn 2011; 
Dellarocas et al. 2011; Bar-Isaac et al. 2011) on the impacts of online institutions such 
as search engine and news aggregators, no previous studies have answered whether 
the associations between different online institutions and online traffic are 
significantly different. The second part of this paper aims to provide a descriptive 
                                                          
11
 Binary regression between the two variables have a positive coefficient significant at 1%.  
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evidence to shed light on this question. 
In order to differentiate between the online traffic generated by different online 
institutions, I obtained the total online traffic the newspapers received. Depending on 
the method of search and the online institutions that directed traffic to the newspaper 
sites, I further disaggregated this online traffic into direct traffic, search traffic, 
aggregators’ traffic, and social media traffic. When comparing online traffic, I 
focused on the concentrations of the different institutions within the online news 
industry by presenting Lorenz curves12 of the online traffic generated by each online 
institution. For this comparison, I used a cross-sectional data set of January 2011. 
These details are presented in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, to test whether the presented 
Lorenz curves are statistically different from each other, I conducted K–S tests, the 
details for which are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
3.4.  RESULTS 
3.4.1. NEWSPAPERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ADOPTION AND ONLINE TRAFFIC 
Table 3.3 present the estimated coefficients from equations (1) and (2). The first 
column represents the impact of Twitter adoption on newspapers' online readership. 
As can be seen, newspapers' Twitter adoptions have had a positive impact on 
attracting readerships to their websites. Newspapers' Twitter adoptions were 
associated with an additional one percent increase in online readership each month 
                                                          
12
 A Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution of the empirical 
probability distribution. Each point on the curve represents a statement such as “the bottom x percent 
of all newspapers have y percent of the total market shares.” Therefore, the closer the Lorenz curve to a 
45 degree line, the less concentrated is the underlying online traffic. 
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after the adoptions. However, the second column shows that this association might 
not be constant over time; the association between Twitter adoptions and online 
readership is the strongest when newspapers just adopted Twitter, but the association 
decreases over time.  
 
TABLE 3.3: The impact of newspapers' Twitter adoptions on their online traffic  
 Dependent variable:      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      0.011** 0.019** -0.002 -0.003 
 (2.60) (2.26) (-1.57) (-0.37) 
     
        -0.0002**   
  (-2.19)   
     
                  0.0221**  
   (2.55)  
     
                0.011** 
    (2.01) 
     
Newspaper fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  12,306 12,306 12,306 12,306 
 
1. Unit: followers in millions, tweets in ten thousand  
2. t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05 
 
The third column tests whether the association observed in the first column is 
affected by the size of online networks on Twitter. As can be seen in the third column, 
the estimated association between newspapers' Twitter adoptions and their online 
readership is negative (i.e. coefficient    in equation (2) is negative) when the 
number of followers is assumed to be set as zero, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The interaction term between the variable         and the 
number of followers is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that the 
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association between the two variables increases in the size of online networks on 
Twitter. Considering the large variation in the number of Twitter followers, as can be 
seen in Table 3.1, this evidence suggests that the estimated association between 
Twitter adoptions and online readership might heavily depend on the size of online 
networks.  
A similar analysis was conducted in column 4, in which I used the number of 
tweets message created on Twitter in place of the number of Twitter followers. In 
column (4), I obtained a similar result as in column (3). The result suggests that the 
estimated association might be minimal for newspapers that have a small number 
tweets while the association is significantly positive for those with a large number of 
tweets. The fact that the results with the number of followers and tweets are similar is 
not a surprise given the fact that the two variables (the number of followers and 
tweets) have a significant positive correlation; on average, newspapers with a large 
number of followers on Twitter tweet more frequently than those with a small number 
of followers.  
 
3.4.2.  COMPARISON OF ONLINE TRAFFIC GENERATED BY DIFFERENT ONLINE 
INSTITUTIONS 
I now report the results of the comparisons of online readership generated by different 
online institutions (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.4). Figure 3.1 shows the Lorenz curves for 
direct traffic, social media traffic, aggregators’ traffic, and search traffic. It can be 
seen that direct traffic is the least concentrated, while search traffic is the most highly 
concentrated. Social media traffic and aggregators’ traffic lie somewhere in between, 
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though social media traffic is less concentrated than aggregators’ traffic. Table 3.4 
presents the results of the K–S tests. As seen here, the observed differences in the 
Lorenz curves are statistically significant. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Lorenz curves of online traffic by online institutions 
 
 
TABLE 3.4: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Tests 
Comparison Groups Coefficient D P-value Corrected 
Social media vs. Direct traffic 0.246 0.000  0.000  
Social media vs. Search traffic 0.431 0.000  0.000  
Social media vs. Aggregators traffic 0.310 0.000  0.000  
 
Direct traffic may be regarded as a proxy for what the total traffic would have 
been without search engines and news aggregators. Social media traffic is less 
concentrated than search traffic or aggregators’ traffic probably because of the two 
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reasons proposed in Section 2—social media sites generally do not rank information 
and they provide a platform for news organizations to reach out to their audiences. 
However, social media traffic is still more concentrated than direct traffic, suggesting 
that information within social media sites might be still susceptible to cascades to 
some extent. For instance, even though you are only following your local, regional 
newspaper on Twitter, and not The New York Times, people whom you follow are 
more likely to recommend to you an article from The New York Times compared to an 
article from your local newspaper. In this case, even though you are not directly 
following The New York Times, you are likely to click on the New York Times 
article.
13
 This process could result in the higher concentration of social media traffic 
compared to direct traffic. 
 
3.5.  CONCLUSION & LIMITATIONS 
This study estimated an association between newspapers’ Twitter adoption and their 
online readership. I present evidence of a positive association between the two 
variables, and observe that the association increases in the size of online networks 
created in social media. Considering the large variations in the size of online 
networks, as can be seen in Table 3.1, and previous evidence (e.g. Schlozman et al. 
2012) that find a highly concentrated distribution of the size of social media networks 
among social media adopters, the evidence may indicate that the estimated 
association might heavily depend on the size of online networks in social media. 
Then, in order to see whether the online readership generated by social media sites 
                                                          
13
 As a result, you are more likely to follow The New York Times as well. 
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differs from that generated by other online institutions, I compare the distributions of 
online readership generated by social media sites, search engine, and news 
aggregators. Social media traffic was less concentrated compared to the traffic 
generated by search engines or news aggregators, but; it was more concentrated than 
direct traffic. A possible answer for this observation might be that social media traffic 
is less susceptible to cascades than search engines or news aggregators, although not 
entirely protected from cascades. 
However, it is important to be clear that the observed coefficients in equations (1) 
and (2) show descriptive associations rather than causal impacts of Twitter adoptions. 
For equations (1) and (2) to yield an unbiased and consistent estimate, one critical 
assumption has to be made: newspapers’ adoption of Twitter is independent of any 
idiosyncratic shocks on online traffic. In other words, after controlling for the factors 
that affect online traffic, such as newspaper quality or time trends, the treatment (i.e., 
newspapers’ Twitter adoption) must be random across newspapers; that is, it should 
be uncorrelated with any omitted variables that impact online traffic, which is indeed 
a strong assumption. For example, a possible omitted variable that might still bias the 
estimates is the newspapers’ adoption of other social media sites. It is highly possible 
and likely that news organizations will adopt Facebook at the same time at which they 
adopt Twitter. In this case, the estimated coefficients in equations (1) and (2) may be 
overestimated, and we should interpret these coefficients as the association between 
online news traffic and social media adoptions, in general, rather than Twitter 
adoptions in particular.  
The second analysis with Lorenz curves also has its limitations. The presented 
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evidence aims to highlight the differences between the online traffic generated by 
social media sites and that generated by other online institutions. However, although 
useful, the evidence is a descriptive rather than an analytical empirical analysis, and 
thus does not show a clear association between social media adoptions and online 
traffic. For example, the analysis does not estimate the potential substitutions among 
different online institutions. In other words, when a newspaper adopts a social media 
site, this site will direct traffic to the newspaper site; this is called social media traffic 
in this paper. However, it may also crowd out some direct traffic or traffic that is 
directed by other online institutions.
14
 Therefore, it is possible that newspapers’ 
adoption of social media tools would have a smaller impact on their online traffic 
than what the result of this study suggests. 
Furthermore, like other studies estimating the impact of social media, the analysis 
in this study is also based on observations that I collected when the Internet and social 
media were still in their “adolescence” (Hindman, 2009). It is important to emphasize 
that the time periods covered in this study might not be reflective of the full impact of 
social media, as some studies have pointed out (Schlozman et al., 2010; Bimber, 
2008).  
Nevertheless, this chapter is the first empirical evidence, to the best of my 
knowledge, that sheds light on the association between social media adoptions and 
online readership in online news industry and the different implications that different 
online institutions may have on the distribution of online readership. The association 
is estimated to be significantly positive and to increase in the size of online networks 
                                                          
14
 Evidence of substitutions among different online institutions is rare. However, previous studies have 
estimated substitutions between online and offline newspapers (Gentzkow, 2007; George, 2008; 
Filistrucchi, 2005) and between online and offline advertising channels (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011). 
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created on social media sites. A descriptive evidence suggests that the association 
between social media adoptions and online readership is different from the 
associations between other online institutions and online readership.   
105 
 
3. 6. REFERENCE 
Athey, S., E. Calvano, and J. Gans (2011). The Impact of the Internet on Advertising 
Markets for News Media. working paper. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V.  A simple model of herd behavior, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol.107, No.3, (Aug., 1992), p797-817. 
Bar-Isaac, H., Caruana, G. and Cuñat, V. (2011), Search, Design, and Market 
Structure, NET Institute Working Paper 09-17 . 
Bikkchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D, &Welch, I (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political 
Economy 100:5, 992-1026 
Bimber, Bruce. (1998). “The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, 
Community, and Accelerated Pluralism.” Polity 31(1): 138–60. 
Chi, Feng and Yang, Nathan (2010). Twitter Adoption in Congress. Review of 
Network Economics 10. 
Chiou, Lesley and Tucker, Catherine E. (2010). News, Copyright, and Online 
Aggregators. Working paper. Retrieved from http://econ.hunter.cuny.edu/media-
economics-workshop/conference-papers/chiou%20and%20tucker%20news.pdf 
Dellarocas, C., Katona, Z., and Rand, W., (2011), Media, Aggregators and the Link 
Economy: Strategic Hyperlink Formation in Content Networks, working paper 
Duan, W., Gu, B., and Whinston, A.B. (2008) Informational Cascades and Software 
Adoption on the Internet: An Empirical Investigation. MIS Quarterly, 32(4),  
Emmett, A. (2009). Networking news. American Journalism Review.  
106 
 
Farhi, P. (2009). The Twitter Explosion. American Journalism Review. Retrieved on 
December 2, 2010 from http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4756. 
Filistrucchi, Lapo. (2005). The Impact of the Internet on the Market for Daily 
Newspapers in Italy. EUI Working Paper 12/2005. 
Gentzkow, M. (2007). Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: 
Online Newspapers, American Economic Review, 97(3), 713-744. 
George, Lisa. and Hogendorn, Christiaan. (2011), Aggregators, Search and the 
Economics of New Online institutions, working paper 
George, L. M. (2008). The Internet and the Market for Daily Newspapers. The B.E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8 (1). 
Goldfarb, Avi, Tucker, C., (2011). Search Engine Advertising: Channel Substitution 
when Pricing Ads to Context, Management Science, Vol 57, No 3, March 2011, 
pp. 458 - 470 
Hindman, Matthew. (2009). The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Messner, Marcus, Linke, Maureen, and Eford, Asriel (2011). Shoveling tweets: An 
analysis of the microblogging engagement of traditional news organizations, 
Working paper 
Pew Internet & American Life Project (2010, March 1). The new news landscape: 
Rise of the Internet. Retrieved from http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1508/internet-
cell-phone-users-news-socialexperience 
Pew Internet & American Life Project (2009, February 12). Twitter and status 
updating. Retrieved from 
107 
 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP%20Twitter%20M
emo%20FINAL.pdf 
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2010, Sept. 14). Americans 
spending more time following the news. Retrieved from http://people-
press.org/report/652/ 
Porter, J. (2009) Relationship Symmetry in Social Networks: Why Facebook will go 
Fully Asymmetric.. Bokardo — URL: 
<http://bokardo.com/archives/relationship-symmetry-in-social-networks-why-
facebook-will-go-fully-asymmetric/>. Consulted 1 February 2011 
Salganik M. J., Dodds P. S., and Watts D. J. (2006), An Experimental Study of 
Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, Science 10, 311 
(5762), 854-856. 
Schlozman, K. L., S. Verba and H. E. Brady. (2010). ‘Weapon of the Strong? 
Participatory Inequality and the Internet’, Perspectives on Politics 8 (2): 487-
509. 
Schlozman, K. L., S. Verba and H. E. Brady. (2012). The Unheavenly Chorus: 
Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy, 
Chapter 16, Post Script: A Preliminary Look at the Digital Organization, 
Princeton University Press 
Tucker, C., Zhang, J., How Does Popularity Information Affect Choices? A Field 
Experiment, Management Science, 57: 828-842 
108 
 
CHAPTER 4:  
SOCIAL MEDIA, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND DEMOCRACY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1. THE RECENT ADOPTIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN POLITICS 
The recent advent of new information technology, along with the resulting social 
media—such as Facebook and Twitter—and its enthusiastic use in political 
competition, has rekindled attention on the role of new information technology in 
politics. Currently, almost every major American politician has a Twitter
1
 account, 
and many employ specific staff or even social media consulting firms to maintain 
such accounts. One example of a politician who has used social media to the utmost 
is Barack Obama, who utilized Twitter to hold America’s first virtual presidential 
town hall meeting in July 2011. During this event, he responded via his official 
Twitter account to questions posted online by users of social networking services, 
including the chair of the Republican National Committee, Reince Priebus. Many 
commentators described the event as a modern “Kennedy-Nixon TV debate moment” 
that would foreshadow the future use of media in politics. Weeks later, the president 
used Twitter during the debt ceiling debate to mobilize his 9.4 million followers and 
asked them to “tweet at your Republican legislators and urge them to support a 
bipartisan compromise to the debt crisis.” The growing importance of Twitter in 
                                                          
1
 Twitter is an online social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and 
read text-based posts of up to 140 characters, known as “tweets.” The service has rapidly gained 
worldwide popularity, with over 300 million users as of 2011 (Taylor, 2011), generating over 200 
million tweets (Twitter, 2011). 
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politics is also evinced by that fact that in October 2010, former House Majority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi made her initial announcement that she would run for House 
Minority Leader not on a major news network, but via Twitter.
23
  
Politicians’ recent active adoption of the new information technology raises an 
important question: Are politicians deriving measurable benefits from their social 
media adoptions, and if so, to what extent? Presumably, politicians have embraced 
this new form of communication technology because they find it effective for 
communicating with their supporters; therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
significant benefits are associated with their use of social media. A few studies have 
attempted to report the potential effects of politicians’ use of social media. For 
instance, a body of literature provides descriptive evidence that online attitudes, as 
measured through the sentiments of “tweets,” correlates well with public sentiment as 
measured through polls (Tumasjan et al. 2010) and that the size of politicians’ online 
networks (e.g., the “friend” count of politicians’ Facebook accounts) is an acceptable 
predictor of public opinion (Wattal et al. 2010; Williams and Gulati 2007).
4
  
  While previous studies have focused on social media use by politicians in 
general, no study, to the best of my knowledge, has empirically investigated this 
                                                          
2
 CongressDaily 11/5/2010, p1-1 
3
 Twitter use has also spread globally to other democracies. The newly elected president of Chile, 
Sebastián Piñera, recently asked his cabinet members to start using the social networking tool. Other 
studies have reported that the number of Japanese politicians using Twitter grew from only 3 to 485 in 
less than a year and that 577 German politicians had opened Twitter accounts.  
4
 Another body of work reports some evidence of the impact of the Internet or new media in general, 
rather than focusing on the impact of only the social media. Some studies find that the dominance 
political elites normally enjoy is reproduced or even magnified on the Internet (Hindman 2008, 
Schlozman et al. 2012), which challenges the optimistic view that the Internet will promote a 
democratic public sphere that reduces inequalities of attention between elites and those outside the 
political mainstream (Agre 2002; Benkler 2006; Bennett & Entman 2002; Gillmore 2004; Jenkins 
2006). Others report that new media may polarize public opinion (Prior 2007; Sunstein 2007; Baum & 
Groeling 2008). 
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phenomenon in the context of election campaigns, even though elections are 
important political activities. Thus, the present research attempts to fill this gap in our 
understanding of the political use of the social media tool, Twitter, by presenting an 
empirical test of the association between politicians’ social media adoption and the 
success of their campaign financing activities, and how this association differs among 
politicians with different online network sizes (e.g., Twitter followers) and varying 
political ideologies.  
 
4.1.2. COMPETING HYPOTHESES: MINIMAL VS. STRONG EFFECTS  
Since the advent of radio and television, researchers have hotly debated the effect of 
new technologies on election campaigns. One school of researchers (Klapper 1960; 
Campbell et al. 1960) follow the famous “minimal effects” thesis, which argued, 
among other things, that political campaigns mediated by information technology 
only marginally affect public opinion. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) provided a theory 
supporting this finding—namely, the “two-step flow of communication”—positing 
that media messages are filtered by opinion leaders through social mediation 
processes. This theory was largely based on social conditions at that time (Bennett & 
Iyengar 2008), which were characterized by (1) a pre-mass-communications media 
system and (2) a group-based society with social capital (Putnam 2000). Opposing 
this theory, however, is another school of thought that has emerged since the 1980s, 
with such underlying social changes as individuals’ disconnection from a group-based 
civil society (Bennett & Iyengar 2008) and better measurements of priming, framing, 
and agenda setting. Numerous studies belonging to this school have suggested that 
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television news could actually determine which issues the public considers important 
(Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder 1982) and that public opinion toward policies could be 
significantly influenced by the content of news stories (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; 
Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Baum 2005; Gentzkow 2006; Gerber, Karlan, & Bergan 
2009).
5
 
However, the emergence of new media, such as cable television and the Internet, 
has led to a new era, in which media may play a different role in political campaigns 
(Bennett & Iyengar 2008). The emergence of new media has created a much wider 
range of media choices; therefore, politicians are no longer able to reach vast 
audiences via a limited number of channels. Supporting this statement, Jenkins (2006) 
has shown that unlike advertisers in the 1960s, who could reach 80% of U.S. women 
with a prime-time spot on ABC, CBS, and NBC, modern advertisers have to run the 
same spot 100 TV channels to reach the same number of viewers. Based on this 
observation, some scholars argue that we may again return to a time of minimal 
effects (Bennett & Iyengar 2008). 
In this study, however, I argue that new media, such as the Internet, will still have 
a significant impact with the rise of a “self-selected” audience as opposed to a more 
“inadvertent” audience during the heyday of network news. Although political 
information in a prime-time spot on three networks would have reached a greater 
audience before, most members of that audience were inadvertent and less likely to 
change their positions in response to the information provided (Negroponte 1995, 
Sunstein 2007; Prior 2007; Bennett & Iyengar 2008). With a large number of media 
outlets, however, people can now self-select the political information that matches 
                                                          
5
 Also see Stromberg (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004), and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). 
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and reinforces their ideological positions. This fragmented audience structure allows 
political elites to influence public opinion through targeted use of new information 
technologies, even though the size of their audience may be smaller.  
In order to test these competing hypotheses, the first consideration should be the 
possible effect of “self-selective” technology. Previous evidence (Chapters 1-3) 
suggests that online technology, such as social media, may concentrate and polarize 
information consumption patterns through a cascade mechanism. Previously, without 
online technology, people had limited chances to interact or network with nonlocal 
politicians, while they can now have a personal conversation with nonlocal candidates 
by “following” or “friending” them. Out of the large number of nonlocal politicians, 
people are more likely to “follow” or “friend” the ones they perceive as more salient 
(Chapter 1, Farrell & Drezner 2008), that is, either nationally recognized or 
ideologically distinctive. Hence, the preferences revealed by people’s “self-selection” 
with these technologies might be more concentrated and polarized than what is 
observable without these technologies. If this online information consumption pattern 
affects political behaviors, such as people’s willingness to contribute to a political 
candidate, we should expect increasing concentration and polarization, not only in 
online information consumption patterns but also in important political outcomes 
such as campaign finance.  
 
4.1.3. SOCIAL MEDIA & POLITICAL FINANCE  
In examining the effects of new information technology on political outcomes, I 
investigate the political use of social media and its effect on political finance. The 
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political effects of such social media technology as Twitter deserve special attention, 
not only because most politicians are using them but also because one of the key 
features of this new technology is to maximize “self-selection,” which is the 
component that leads us to the two different hypotheses of minimal and strong 
effects.
6
 Here, I look particularly at Twitter among the many existing forms of social 
media because its “asymmetric” form of network makes it potentially more conducive 
to political interaction (Porter 2009, Hong & Nadler 2011).
7
  
Political finance, among the many possible political variables, is important for the 
following reasons. First, recent empirical evidence has increasingly indicated that 
political finance has a significant and positive impact on candidate electoral success 
in a number of countries with national, local, and multiparty elections (Benoit and 
Marsh 2008), regardless of whether the candidates are challengers or incumbents
8
. 
Second, online technology may have great potential for revolutionizing how 
politicians raise money for their campaigns, as Obama’s extraordinary success at 
Internet fundraising in the 2008 presidential election suggests. In 2008, presidential 
candidates raised more than $1.6 billion, an increase of more than 149 percent over 
the amount raised by presidential candidates in 2004. The Internet, along with social 
media technologies, has often been identified as one of the most important 
                                                          
6
 Further, previous evidence (Hong 2012) implies that social media technology is an ideal platform for 
political campaigning as it provides a greater potential for politicians to reach out to their targeted 
audiences rather than just waiting for search engines to direct traffic to them. 
7
 Twitter differs from many other alternative social media, such as Facebook, in the sense that it 
enables asymmetric networks. For example, Twitter users (say, a politician) can find him or herself in 
the “asymmetric” position of following the tweets of a small number of users, while his or her own 
tweets are followed by 3 million users (Porter 2009). Twitter can thus function as a form of social 
media that is potentially more conducive to political interaction (Porter 2009). 
8
 There is an ongoing debate over whether the impact of campaign spending is more significant for 
challengers than for incumbents The former view is supported by Abramowitz (1988, 1991), 
Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994), Green and Krasno (1988), Jacobson (1978, 1990), and the latter view 
by Gerber (1998) and Moon (2006). 
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contributing factors to the increase in fundraising in 2008 (Weintraub & Levine 2009). 
Finally, political representation in the United States is often described as “‘surrogate,’ 
in which citizens are represented by legislators with whom they have no electoral 
relationship” (Mansbridge 2003, 522), and this surrogate representation is primarily 
expressed through campaign contributions (Mansbridge 2003, Gimpel et al. 2008). 
 
4.1.4. IN-STATE VS. OUT-OF-STATE DONATIONS 
For the purpose of my research, I classify campaign contributions as in-state and out-
of-state. The terms in-state and out-of state are defined with reference to the states in 
the United States and to the fact that a significant number of people do donate to 
candidates outside their home state. Out-of-state implies a state that the politician 
does not represent, and similarly, in-state implies the home state of a politician. I 
examine the association between political use of social media and political finance 
separately for in-state and out-of-state donations for two reasons.
9
  
First, and most important, the widespread political use of social media may have 
different effects on in-state and out-of-state donations: It is likely to increase the 
relative importance of out-of-state donations compared to in-state donations, because 
contributions to nonlocal candidates are often hampered by information barriers 
                                                          
9
 An alternative way of conducting the analysis would be to do so at congressional district level. 
However, in this study, I use state-level rather than district-level observations for two reasons. Most 
important is that in-state and out-of-state donations may have different implications for the system of 
representation in the United States, and the boundaries of states are the most important geographical 
unit of political representation. For instance, the U.S. Constitution grants rights of representation in 
Congress to states, not to congressional districts or individual citizens (Rehfield 2005; Gimpel et al. 20
08). Further, campaign finance data is observed at the zip code level and the provided zip code areas 
are, in many cases, split by congressional district boundaries. Thus, the in-state and out-of-state 
comparison is likely to provide a more robust estimate than a similarly defined in-district and out-of-
district comparison.  
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between individuals and the candidates. Networks formed through social media can 
reduce these information costs in the following manner: Networks constructed in a 
non-formal setting through social media technologies may help citizens to learn about 
the politicians. This knowledge is important because “to become engaged in the 
fundraising efforts of out-of-district candidates, citizens need to learn about them and 
come to believe that they will be a sensible investment of campaign dollars” (Gimpel 
et al. 2008, 375). Further, individuals generally contribute to political campaigns 
mainly because they are asked to do so (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995; Francia et 
al. 2003; Grant and Rudolph 2002). Their willingness to contribute is greatly affected 
by social networks formed in a variety of settings (Brady et al. 1999; Cho and Gimpel 
2007; Gimpel et al. 2006), which may include the online networks on social media.  
Second, the differential effects of social media on out-of-state and in-state 
donations may have important implications for the system of representation, political 
equality, and political polarization. In the United States, campaign contribution is an 
important medium through which political representation is expressed (Mansbridge 
2003, Gimpel et al. 2008) and the basis of political representation is geographic. Thus, 
an increase in the relative importance of out-of-state donations might increase the 
discrepancy between whom politicians represent and who supports them financially 
and thus harm the integrity of the system of representation as well as political equality 
(Beitz 1989). An increase in the relative importance of out-of-state donations may 
also have implications for political polarization. People contribute to nonlocal 
candidates whom they sympathize with ideologically (Gimpel et al. 2008); thus, 
ideologically distinctive members are more likely to receive out-of-state 
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contributions.
10
 Thus, if out-of-state donations become relatively more important with 
the new information technology, then candidates with extreme ideological positions 
would have a higher chance of winning elections, which may increase polarization.  
 
4.2. DATA 
4.2.1. SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITIES 
This study uses observations of social media activities by members of the 112th U.S. 
House of Representatives. The sample contains information about 416 politicians 
whose campaign finance data were identified, including 316 who have adopted 
Twitter. Out of the 316 Twitter accounts, I exclude accounts that are either inactive or 
premature,
11
 and consider only the remaining 189 accounts as valid. I collected data 
on politicians’ Twitter activities between June 8 and 22, 2011. These data include the 
exact date of their first Twitter posts, the number of followers, users followed, and the 
number of posts (“tweets”) made at the time of data collection. I observed the 
politicians’ number of Twitter followers once in June 2011. Even though I do not 
have observations on how the number of followers changed over time, I have 
observations on the dates when politicians adopted Twitter. 
 
4.2.2. CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
                                                          
10
 For formal theory that explains the relevance of political candidates' ideological profile in campaign 
donors, see, for example, Aldrich (1983), among many.  
11
 I did not consider those politicians whose Twitter activities satisfy at least one of the following 
conditions: (1) the number of posts (“tweets”) is smaller than 50; (2) it has been less than 6 months 
since they opened the account; or (3) the number of followers is smaller than 1000. 
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I obtained data on politicians’ campaign finance from the Center for Responsive 
Politics.
12
 The original source of these data was the publicly available Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) files on individual contributions between January 2005 
and December 2010. The FEC maintains information on individual contributors who 
have donated more than $200
13
 to a single politician, and previous evidence suggests 
that individual contributions in amounts of less than $200 generally account for a 
very small part of the candidate's total fundraising (Gimpel et al. 2008).
14
 Because I 
am interested in the impact of politicians’ social media network on their fundraising, I 
focus on individual contributions and exclude the contributions from political action 
committees (PACs) and self-financing.
15
 The data from the FEC contained 
information about the donations the representatives collected before they were elected. 
In order to control for the effect of incumbent status on donations, I excluded the 
donations that politicians had collected before they assumed their posts as 
representatives.
16
  
 
4.2.3. IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISM 
I measure politicians’ ideological extremism by the folded DW-Nominate score as in 
                                                          
12
 www.opensecrets.org 
13
 All money amounts are assumed to be in U.S. dollars. Candidates must disclose the names, addresses, 
and employers of any contributor who gives more than $200. 
14
 According to the Center for Responsive Politics, large individual contributions (individual 
contributions greater than $200) consisted of 47 and 48 percent of total contributions collected by 
House Democrats and Republicans, respectively.  
15
 In fact, individual contribution is a far more important source for political campaigns than 
contributions from political action committees (PACs) or corporations (Ansolabehere, deFigueiredo, 
and Snyder 2003; Thielmann and Wilhite 1989).  
16
 Alternatively, I included an indicator variable called            , which takes a value of 1 if the 
politician collected donations when he or she was the representative and 0 otherwise. The estimated 
results were highly robust and do not depend on the specification.  
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previous studies (e.g., Chapter 1, Gimpel et al. 2008). Specifically, I first subtracted 
the median value from the DW-Nominate score and took its absolute value so that a 
value of 0 indicates a moderate ideological position with a median DW-Nominate 
score, and a positive number implies greater political extremism (either conservative 
or liberal). The DW-Nominate score and thus the extreme index was available for 334 
politicians. Specifically, politician i’s extreme index is as follows:  
 
                                           
 
4.2.4. ADDITION DATA 
I collected the following additional sets of data.
17
 In order to control for the 
geographical heterogeneity of online networks, I also collected information about 
followers’ posted geographical information at the U.S. state level. When I excluded 
the number of Twitter users residing in foreign countries, approximately 85 percent of 
those who were following the politicians indicated their home state in the sample. I 
omitted those users whose geographic information was not available. In addition, in 
order to control for politicians’ use of other social media tools such as Facebook, 
MySpace, YouTube, and RSS, I use an indicator variable to control for each social 
media tool. I also include an indicator variable for whether a politician chairs a 
committee. Table 4.5 describes these politicians’ characteristics as variables included 
in the study.  
                                                          
17
 I use these additional sets of data in the robustness check with cross-sectional observations. In panel 
data regressions, I use the politicians’ fixed effect instead of controlling for the variables of politicians’ 
characteristics.  
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Table 4.5: Politicians’ use of social media other than Twitter 
 
Variable 
Politicians’ Social media 
adoptions (%)  
Standard Deviation 
Facebook 65% 0.48 
Flick 19% 0.40 
YouTube 75% 0.43 
RSS 57% 0.50 
MySpace 3% 0.18 
 
 
4.3. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ADOPTION ON FUNDRAISING 
In this section, I investigate the impact of politicians’ use of social media on their 
campaign finance. I am especially interested in whether (1) politicians saw an 
increase in their donations following their social media adoptions, (2) the political use 
of social media has made political finance more egalitarian, and (3) politicians with 
ideologically extreme positions have benefited most.  
 
4.3.1. DOES SOCIAL MEDIA MATTER IN POLITICS? 
By observing the dates that politicians adopted Twitter, I tested whether the donations 
to politicians increased after their social media adoptions, controlling for the 
characteristics of the politicians and contributors as well as for common time trends 
in the donations to all representatives combined.  
Given that I have weak priors on the functional form of how donations will 
change after politicians adopt Twitter, I start by estimating a generalized additive 
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model (GAM) rather than by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
which must specify a functional form in advance. GAM is a semi-parametric 
technique, which allows the relationship between the explanatory and outcome 
variables to take a flexible, smooth functional form (Jackman and Beck 1998). The 
empirical framework I use in this section is as follows: 
 
                                            
                             
(5) 
 
The dependent variable              is either the number of individual contributors 
or the amount from individual donations from state j to politician i at monthly time 
indicator t. I transformed this variable logarithmically to interpret coefficients as 
percentage changes. The variable         measures the number of months passed 
after or remaining before politician i adopted Twitter. Thus,         is 0 when 
politician i has adopted Twitter, and              is a dummy variable indicating 
whether region j is out-of-state for politician i. I also included    and   , which are 
the politician and state fixed effects, in order to control for unobservable 
characteristics of politicians and contributors, respectively.  
I control for     , which is the general time trend of donations,18  as well as 
                , which is a set of dummy variables indicating the number of 
months remaining before politician i's next election. By controlling for 
                , I could compare, for instance, the donation that each politician 
                                                          
18
 Because of the limited capacity of the statistical package R in estimating GAM, I control for a 
quadratic time trend in equation (5), rather than for a nonparametric time trend. Yet, I control for a 
nonparametric time trend in OLS estimations.  
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collected one month before election in 2010 with what he or she had collected one 
month before election in 2006 or 2008.  
The sample for GAM estimation includes only the 72-month window around 
politician i’s Twitter adoption. The 72-month treatment window begins 3 years (36 
months) before the adoption of Twitter. The pre-adoption periods are included to 
verify whether the increase in donations after the adoption can be attributable to 
politicians’ Twitter adoption.19  
I estimated the regression in (5) with a full sample and then separately for 
donations from out-of-state and in-state
20
 to determine whether the impact of Twitter 
adoption on donations differs between these two regions. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show 
the estimated effects from equation (5), along with 95 percent confidence bands,
21
 for 
the full sample, including donations from both in-state and out-of-state. Figure 4.1 
uses the number of donations as the dependent variable, whereas Figure 4.2 uses the 
amount from donations.  
 
  
                                                          
19
 The function      is a smooth penalized spline function, and the model also assumes that within 
each 72-month window the error in any single month is assumed to be normally distributed and 
correlated with previous shocks only through the last periods. The model estimates are calculated with 
the mgcv package in the statistical package R. 
20
 For the regression described above to yield consistent estimates, the critical assumption is that the 
treatment (Twitter adoption) in a period is independent of the idiosyncratic shocks to donations in that 
period. In other words, after controlling for time-invariant characteristics, such as politician and state 
characteristics that affect donations in each period, the treatment (i.e., a politician’s Twitter adoption) 
must be random across politicians. This is a strong but plausible assumption. The main factor 
determining the timing of a politician’s Twitter adoption was assumed to be exogenous to time-varying 
factors.  
21
 The confidence bands are based on standard errors that were corrected for heteroskedasticity across 
politicians and serial correlation among politicians. 
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Figure 4.1: Impact of Twitter adoption on the number of donations over time 
4.1.1 Full sample GAM estimates 
 
 
4.1.2 Out-of-states sample GAM estimates 
 
 
4.1.3 In-states sample GAM estimates 
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Twitter adoption on the amount of donations over time 
 
 
4.2.1 Full sample GAM estimates 
 
 
4.2.2 Out-of-states sample GAM estimates 
 
 
4.2.3 In-states sample GAM estimates 
 
 
Note: The horizontal axis is the variable        , which measures the number of months 
passed after or remaining before a politician i adopted Twitter. Thus,         is 0 when the 
politician i adopted Twitter.  
 
 
124 
 
As can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the estimated effects tend to become 
positive approximately 12 months after the adoption with an upward trend. As the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of donations, the estimated marginal impacts can 
be interpreted as approximate percentage changes in either the number of or amount 
from donations resulting from Twitter adoption. Thus, 36 months after Twitter 
adoption, politicians who adopted Twitter received approximately 15 and 90 percent 
more donations in terms of the number and amount, respectively, than those who did 
not. Another important point in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is that in-state donations do not 
show the estimated effects on donations. The estimated coefficients tend to increase 
in the out-of-state sample (4.1.2 and 4.2.2), but not in the in-state sample (Figures 
4.1.3 and 4.2.3).  
 
4.3.2. DOES SOCIAL MEDIA CREATE A MORE EGALITARIAN POWER STRUCTURE? 
A drawback of equation (5) is that the model does not consider the variation in the 
number of Twitter followers. Thus, the estimates in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reflect the 
average impact for each time period after Twitter adoption. The problem, however, is 
that some politicians may have differentially benefited from using Twitter, depending 
on the size of their online networks. In order to address the question of who benefits 
from adopting the new technology, I first grouped politicians into 10 subgroups with 
respect to the size of their online networks (i.e., the number of Twitter followers) and 
ran the following regression:  
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(6) 
 
Now,         measures the number of months passed after politician i adopted 
Twitter. Thus,         is now an integer greater than or equal to zero. Unlike in 
equation (4), I assume that the impact of social media increases linearly after the 
adoption and estimate OLS instead of GAM because estimating an interaction impact 
with GAM is computationally too demanding.
22
 Politician i's number of Twitter 
followers is             measured in ten thousands. I include the interaction between 
        and            to see whether the effect estimated with equation (5) 
depends on the size of the networks on Twitter. The coefficient of this interaction 
term is expected to be positive, which can be a useful test to see whether the 
estimated effect with equation (5) is, in fact, associated with politicians’ Twitter 
activities. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the estimated results of equation (6). Again, I estimated 
the regression in (6) with a full sample and then separately for donations from out-of-
state and in-state. For the full sample and out-of-state donations, the coefficient    is 
estimated to be significantly positive. This evidence further supports that the 
estimated effects with equation (5) in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are associated with 
politicians’ Twitter activities. For in-state donations, however, the coefficient was 
significantly positive with the number of donations, but not with the amount. Overall, 
the associations between politicians’ Twitter activities and donations are more 
                                                          
22
 In fact, this linear assumption turns out to be a reasonable assumption from the semi-parametric 
GAM estimations in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
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obvious for out-of-state donations than for in-state donations.  
 
Table 4.1: Impact of Twitter adoption on the number of donations 
interaction with the number of Twitter followers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from out-
of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from in-
states 
    
Adopt 0.001
*
 0.002
**
 -0.008
*
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
    
adoptⅹfollowers 0.001
**
 0.001
**
 0.003
**
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
N 316,525 292,698 23,827 
Adj. R
2
 0.405 0.160 0.402 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Impact of Twitter adoption on the amount of donations 
interaction with the number of Twitter followers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from out-
of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from in-
states 
    
adopt 0.007
**
 0.009
**
 -0.015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) 
    
adoptⅹfollowers 0.005
**
 0.005
**
 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
    
N 316,525 292,698 23,827 
Adj. R
2
 0.271 0.147 0.370 
 
1. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
2. The number of followers is in ten thousands 
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Figure 4.3: Highly concentrated number of Twitter followers 
 
 
 
High-profile politicians' dominance on Twitter 
 
Definition of high-
profile politicians 
Share of high-profile politicians' numbers of Twitter 
followers out of Representatives' total number of followers 
Top 6 35.7% 
Top 8 42.8% 
Top 10 47.0% 
Top 15 54.4% 
Top 20 58.6% 
 
 
The evidence that politicians with larger online networks have benefitted more 
than others suggests that political competition might become less egalitarian with the 
advent of information technology and its active use in politics. Figure 4.3 plots 
politicians’ number of Twitter followers as of June 2011 against their ranks in terms 
of the number. This figure shows that politicians’ Twitter networks are highly 
concentrated. The ten high-profile politicians having the largest number of Twitter 
followers possess almost half (47 percent) of all the representatives’ followers 
combined. In sum, the estimates imply that the active use of social media in politics 
may increase inter-candidate resource inequality in political competitions.  
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4.3.3. DO EXTREMISTS BENEFIT MORE FROM SOCIAL MEDIA? 
As I show in Chapter 1, technology like the social media tends to more easily identify 
the more salient ideas (e.g., new ideas or ideas no one has ever talked about for some 
reason) and is thus more likely to benefit political extremists. Further, the evidence 
that donations have increased from out-of-state—albeit relatively little, if any, from 
in-state—leads us to consider the importance of ideology in the self-selection process. 
Out-of-state donors are more likely to be people who ideologically sympathize with 
politicians, so an increase in out-of-state donors may imply an increasing importance 
in ideology with reference to social media adoption.  
 
                                                        
                 
(7) 
 
Equation (7) aims to test this argument. I followed previous studies (e.g., Gimpel et al. 
2008) in measuring ideological extremism. The variable          is the folded DW-
Nominate score, which measures the ideological position of politician i, with a greater 
number referring to a more politically extreme position, either liberally or 
conservatively.  
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Table 4.3: Impact of Twitter adoption on the number of donations 
interaction with ideological extremism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from out-
of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from in-
states 
    
adopt 0.002
**
 0.002
**
 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
    
adoptⅹextreme 0.002
**
 0.004
**
 -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
    
N 282,900 261,562 21,338 
Adj. R
2
 0.399 0.144 0.539 
 
 
Table 4.4: Impact of Twitter adoption on the amount of donations 
interaction with ideological extremism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from out-
of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from in-
states 
    
adopt 0.013
**
 0.013
**
 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
    
adoptⅹextreme 0.004 0.008
*
 -0.021 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) 
    
N 282,900 264,008 21,338 
Adj. R
2
 0.262 0.128 0.357 
 
1. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
2. The number of observations is smaller than in Tables 4.1-2 as DW Nominate scores were 
not available for all the politicians in the sample 
 
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the estimated impact in terms of the number of and 
amount from donations, respectively. Overall, the results suggest that a large part of 
the financial benefits associated with social media adoption is observed among high-
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profile politicians with ideologically extreme positions.
23
 This evidence supports the 
argument that an increase in out-of-state donations may imply that political ideology 
is becoming increasingly important, with the recent emergence of social media as a 
political communication tool, in shaping the relationships between politicians and 
their donors.  
 
4.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
My findings so far can be summarized as follows: (1) Politicians’ Twitter adoptions 
have had a significantly positive effect on an increase in their out-of-state donations. 
(2) The effect was driven mainly by a small number of politicians with large online 
networks (“Twitter followers”). (3) The effect is higher for politicians with extreme 
ideological positions. 
In this section, I focus on the first finding—the significant effect of social media 
adoption on fundraising—and present two additional tests that support the estimated 
result. First, I estimate a model with cross-sectional observations to determine 
whether the estimated result appears consistent with the previous finding. In the 
previous section, the empirical strategy was to test whether donations increased after 
politicians adopted Twitter. However, this time-series observation is missing an 
important part of the story by overlooking the association between a politician’s 
number of Twitter followers from state j and the politician's donations from state j. If 
Twitter adoptions have an impact on donations, it would be reasonable to find a 
                                                          
23
 In fact, the estimated effect was not symmetric for left- and right-leaning politicians. Republican 
extremists have enjoyed a much larger extremism premium than Democrat extremists have.  
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positive association between these two variables. This association can be tested in 
only cross-sectional observations as the number of followers was observed once in 
June 2011. Thus, I examine whether an increase in politician i’s Twitter followers 
from state j is associated with an increase in politician i’s donations from state j.  
The second robustness check involves focusing on the politicians with the highest 
number of Twitter followers to determine whether their donations have increased. 
Given the evidence so far, it is reasonable to expect that those high-profile politicians 
would have had a higher increase in donations than a comparable group of politicians. 
I restrict my attention to the six topmost politicians, who are those with more than 
40,000 followers as of June 2011, and employ a difference-in-difference (DID) 
strategy to see whether their financial benefits have been greater than those of other 
politicians from the same states.  
 
4.4.1. CROSS-SECTIONAL OBSERVATIONS 
The following model forms the basis of the empirical analysis in this section. 
Suppose that before social media was actively used in politics, donations from state j 
to politician i were determined by three factors: politician i’s individual 
characteristics, state j’s characteristics, and whether state j is out-of-state for politician 
i. Subsequently, after politicians began to use social media to communicate with their 
potential supporters, the donations are also affected by the politicians’ use of new 
information technology (            and             ).  
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(8) 
           
                           (9) 
 
           
  and            
  are measures of fundraising from region j to politician 
i. I use either the number of or the total amount from donations for            
  and 
           
 . Superscripts A and B indicate the periods before and after the 
introduction of social media.            
  is the donations during the 2005-2006 
election cycle, while            
  is the donations during the 2009-2010 election 
cycle. Thus, for these cross-sectional observations, I limit my sample to the 
politicians who worked as representatives in both cycles. The state and politicians’ 
fixed effects are    and   , respectively, and              is a dummy variable 
indicating whether region j is out-of-state for politician i.             is the number 
of politician i’s Twitter followers from region j, and              is the set of 
covariates that measure politician i’s adoption of social media technology other than 
Twitter. These include Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, and RSS (see Table 4.5 for 
additional information). I also include a dummy variable indicating whether politician 
i newly became the chair of a committee during 2009-2010.  
Then, I subtracted equation (9) from equation (8) to arrive at equation (10), the 
estimated functional form. Note that the politician and state fixed effects are removed 
in this equation. Both             and            
      are transformed 
logarithmically in order to interpret coefficients as percentage differences. The 
133 
 
dependent variable              is the change in the log number of or amount from 
politician i’s individual donations from region j. 
 
                                               (10) 
 
As in previous sections, I estimate equation (10) separately for in-state and out-of-
state donations. Table 4.6 presents the estimated results of equation (10). Although 
the fit of the model was poor, as indicated by the R-squared statistics, the result still 
supports the previous estimates that politicians’ Twitter adoptions had a positive 
impact on out-of-state donations. A 100 percent increase in the number of Twitter 
followers from a state was positively associated with a 16 percent change in the 
number of individual contributors and an 8 percent change in the amount from 
individual donations from that state. These estimates support the finding in the 
previous section.  
 
 
  
1
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Table 4.6: Estimated association between Twitter followers and donations 
 
Dependent 
variable 
:              
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The number of donations The amount of donations 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from 
out-of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from 
in-states 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from 
out-of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from 
in-states 
       
            0.141
**
 0.162
**
 -0.056 0.024 0.075
*
 -0.355 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.044) (0.039) (0.045) (0.241) 
       
N 4,952 4,759 193 4,952 4,759 193 
Adj. R
2
 0.080 0.088 0.041 0.008 0.009 0.136 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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4.4.2. IS THE BENEFIT OBSERVABLE AMONG TOP POLITICIANS? 
Here, I focus on six politicians whose number of Twitter followers was greater than 
40,000 as of June 2011.
24
 Hereafter, I call those six the “top politicians,” whom I 
regard as the treatment group. The control group is the group of politicians who are 
representatives from the same states as each of the top politicians. The six members 
come from Ohio, California, Wisconsin, Arizona, Minnesota, and New York, so the 
other representatives from each of those states form the control groups. 
In order to employ a DID, I define before- and after-treatment as follows. In the 
previous section, I showed that the effect of Twitter adoptions is positively associated 
with the size of online networks (number of “Twitter followers”). Given the evidence 
that the size of online networks is highly concentrated, I assume that only the six 
politicians have financially benefited from Twitter adoption; thus, I define the after-
treatment period as the period after the top six politicians adopted Twitter. Thus, the 
same cutoff applies for each state, but before- and after-treatment classifications may 
differ across states. Hence, the empirical strategy is to estimate the following 
equation.  
 
                                                    (11) 
 
        is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the politician is the top politician, 
and 0 otherwise.        is a dummy variable indicating the period during which the 
                                                          
24
 Those six are John A. Boehner, Nancy Pelosi, Paul Ryan, Gabrielle Giffords, Michele Bachmann, 
and Anthony D. Weiner. The threshold of 40,000 is somewhat arbitrary, but the estimated result in this 
section is robust with different thresholds.  
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top politician adopted Twitter. The DID estimate, which is of particular interest, is  , 
which captures the financial benefits the top politicians have received from their 
Twitter adoption. The sample covers the period between January 2005 and June 2011. 
The estimated result is reported in Table 4.7. The result indicates that the top 
politicians had a 130 percent increase in out-of-state donations, in either number or 
amount, after they adopted Twitter compared to other politicians from the same state. 
This financial benefit was not clearly observed among in-state donations. We can 
once again verify this estimate in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.5, which report, respectively, 
the percent changes in donations for all the groups included in the DID estimates and 
the time-series change in the amount from out-of-state donations for the six 
politicians. Figure 4.5 shows that the top politicians, except for Nancy Pelosi, have 
had an increase in out-of-states donations following their Twitter adoptions.  
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Table 4.7: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Top politicians versus Others 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 The amount of donations The number of donations 
 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from 
out-of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from 
in-states 
Full sample 
Impacts on 
donations from 
out-of-states 
Impacts on 
donations from 
in-states 
       
        0.691
**
 0.611 0.771
**
 0.537
*
 0.494 0.579
*
 
 (0.300) (0.440) (0.245) (0.308) (0.414) (0.316) 
       
       -0.116 -0.141 -0.0917 -0.0404 -0.0703 -0.0104 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.305) (0.233) (0.223) (0.218) 
       
               0.816
*
 1.353
**
 0.279 0.756 1.277
*
 0.236 
 (0.426) (0.644) (0.418) (0.473) (0.709) (0.509) 
       
N 48 24 24 48 24 24 
adj. R
2
 0.383 0.467 0.418 0.261 0.361 0.176 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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Table 4.8: Percents change in donations: Top politicians versus Others 
 
Treatment versus Control Goups 
In-states donations Out-of-state donations 
% change in % change in 
the amount of  
donations 
the number of  
donations 
the amount of  
donations 
the number of  
donations 
Other Representatives from AZ (Average) -62% -46% -63% -43% 
Gabrielle Giffords -38% -24% 37% 34% 
Other Representatives from CA (Average) 15% 14% 15% 8% 
Nancy Pelosi -16% -11% 1% 15% 
Other Representatives from MN (Average) 43% 30% -4% -12% 
Michele Bachmann 21% 46% 454% 613% 
Other Representatives from NY (Average) -43% -35% -47% -47% 
Anthony D. Wiener 17% 1% 369% 183% 
Other Representatives from OH (Average) 127% 166% 133% 178% 
John A. Boehner 331% 304% 826% 756% 
Other Representatives from WI (Average) -28% -33% -15% -19% 
Paul Ryan -3% -5% 336% 434% 
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Figure 4.5: Time trend of out-of-state donations (in thousands USD) of the top six politicians in terms of the number of Twitter followers 
 
4.8.1. Nancy Pelosi 
 
4.8.2. Gabriel Giffords 
 
4.8.3. John A. Boehner 
 
 
4.8.4. Michele Bachmann 
 
4.8.5. Paul Ryan 
 
4.8.6. Anthony D. Wiener 
 
 
Note: The horizontal axis is the variable        , which measures the number of months passed after or remaining before a politician i adopted Twitter. The horizontal 
axis covers a 6-year period from January 2005 to December 2010.  
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4.5. FINDINGS & POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS  
This study presents evidence that (1) politicians’ social media adoptions have yielded 
increased donations from outside their constituencies but little from their own 
constituencies, (2) politicians with extreme ideologies tend to benefit more from their 
social media adoptions, and (3) the political use of social media may yield increased 
inter-candidate resource inequality.  
The first and second findings have important implications for the integrity of the 
system of political representation as well as for political polarization. They suggest 
that politicians’ use of new information technologies neutralizes the importance of 
geographical distance and highlights ideological positions, therefore increasing the 
discrepancies between whom they represent and who supports them. This 
phenomenon may be detrimental to the integrity of the system of representation, as it 
calls into question politicians’ incentives in representing their constituents. “[W]hen 
financial incentives encourage legislators to subordinate the interests of their 
constituents to those of others elsewhere, an additional form of distortion in the 
system of representation is introduced” (Beitz, 1989, 204).  
Further, the two findings may imply an increasing political polarization due to the 
use of social media. The Internet may bring new people into political giving but may 
not bring in new kinds of people (Schlozman et al. 2008). However, even if the 
Internet does not significantly change the profile of donors in the U.S. as a whole, the 
political implications may change with an analysis from the standpoint of each 
politician. That is, new technologies like social media allow politicians to 
communicate with a “self-selected” group of people online who may have different 
 141 
 
profiles from those whom the politicians used to ask for support offline. One 
possibility is that the “self-selection” technology reduces the information barriers 
between individuals and nonlocal politicians, and allows politicians more easily to 
communicate with people who are from remote geographical locations but who 
sympathize with them ideologically. That is, all else being equal, out-of-state donors 
are more likely to be those who sympathize with the politician ideologically (Gimpel 
et al. 2008), and the evidence of the increased out-of-state donations as well as greater 
financial benefits for political extremists may contribute to the greater ability of 
ideologically intense or extreme candidates to win elections, thereby increasing 
political polarization.
25
  
The third finding also has an important implication for political equality, which is 
a fundamental premise of democracy (Verba et al. 1995, Dahl 2006). To begin with, 
the “surrogate representation” in the United States is often criticized as “embodying 
far more political inequality than does even the traditional legislator-constituent 
relation” (Mansbridge 2003, 523) because the representation is often exercised 
through monetary contributions. Thus, it is often argued that in order to secure 
political equality, the system of political finance in the United States should ensure 
that politicians who participate in political competition have equal opportunities for 
effective political influence (Dahl 1989, Beitz 1989, Cohen 2001).
26
 Although there is 
no consensus as to whether equality of resources is necessary for political equality 
(Beitz, 1989, Wright, 1987, Cohen 2001), equality of resources still may serve “as a 
                                                          
25
 Previous studies report that political extremists are more successful in terms of fundraising (see, for 
example, Ensley 2009; Gimpel et al. 2008) and that this advantage may increase even further with the 
widespread use of the “self-selection” technology. 
26
 See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 63, for similar arguments. 
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convenient proxy for a more complex criterion that would be excessively difficult to 
interpret and administer” (Beitz 1989: 209). Thus, evidence that the widespread 
political use of social media results in increased inter-candidate resource inequality 
implies that the use of new information technology may aggravate rather than 
alleviate political inequality. 
 
4.6. LIMITATION & CONCLUSION 
This study examined whether politicians’ social media adoptions have influenced 
their fundraising. My findings suggest that donations significantly increased after 
politicians adopted social media. Notably, such adoptions have a more dramatic 
impact on out-of-state donations, as there was little evidence that donations from 
politicians’ own constituencies increased following social media adoption.  
My findings have important implications for the integrity of the system of 
political representation, political polarization, and political equality. They also shed 
light on the recent debate about the impact of new information technology on 
democracy. The estimated impact of the new information technology on fundraising 
was much greater than I had anticipated. However, because this study has analyzed a 
phenomenon that continues to evolve rapidly, this estimated impact can hardly be 
regarded as representing the full and final impact of the new social media (Schlozman 
et al., 2010; Bimber, 1998; Xenos and Moy, 2007). Similarly, although I observed 
financial benefits only among politicians with large online networks, as other 
politicians’ online networks grow and mature, the unequal benefits across politicians 
may become less concerning.  
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Further, although the overall pattern of my findings reflects the effect of 
politicians’ social media adoptions, more work would be needed to obtain a more 
precise estimate of causality. For instance, the effect I tested with politicians’ Twitter 
adoptions might need to be understood as the effect of politicians’ social media 
adoptions. If these politicians adopted other social media technologies at the same 
time they adopted Twitter (a highly likely possibility), the effects may be 
overestimated, and we should attribute the estimated effect to political use of the new 
social media in general, rather than to Twitter in particular. Nevertheless, this study is 
among the first to demonstrate empirically the impact of social media adoptions on 
political finance and discuss its implications for political equality, polarization, and 
democracy.  
In Chapter 1, I empirically showed that online institutions like the social media 
concentrate and polarize people’s information consumption patterns, and may thereby 
concentrate and polarize people’s political behaviors (e.g., political giving) as well as 
political outcomes (e.g., political finance), all of which are important political 
implications. Considering the evidence that a significant part of the observed 
concentration and polarization is attributable to cascading (Chapter 1), my findings 
challenge the notion that Internet-mediated political actions or communications will 
necessarily promote democracy.  
 
 
 144 
 
4.7. APPENDIX 
DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISON OF ONLINE AND OFFLINE NETWORKS 
Here, I attempt to compare politicians’ networks on Twitter with their “offline” 
networks in terms of the sizes and geographical diversity of the two networks. The 
problem that arises in such a comparison is that politicians’ networks, especially those 
offline, are hardly observable. In this study, I use the online information obtained 
from the politicians’ social media sites for their online networks and information 
about individual contributors as a proxy for their offline networks. 
One obvious limitation in comparing online and offline networks is that Twitter 
followers are not directly comparable to individual contributors. To become a Twitter 
follower, one needs only to click on the politician’s Twitter webpage, which requires 
a much lower level of dedication compared to that of someone who donates more 
than $200 to the politician’s campaign. Nevertheless, the results of the comparisons 
provide a motivation for the analysis presented in the previous sections. Findings 
suggest that the distribution of online networks (Twitter followers) is significantly 
different from that of offline networks (individual contributors): the former is more 
concentrated and geographically diverse. These differences may be attributable to the 
different levels of commitment required by the two networks, but social media may 
also allow politicians to build networks online that are qualitatively different from 
those built in more traditional ways. 
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Figure 4.7 : Scatter plots: Online vs. Offline networks  
 
4.2.1. Network sizes: online vs. offline 
 
4.2.2. Out-of-state shares: online vs. offline networks 
 
 
Data source : twitter.com; friendorfollow.com; Center for Responsive Politic 
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4.7.1. CONCENTRATION  
It is not clear whether politicians’ online networks in Twitter are also as highly 
concentrated as online traffic. Unlike online traffic to newspaper sites, “following” is 
an expression of explicit interest; therefore, it is less susceptible to cascading, in 
which online traffic becomes concentrated through search engines and aggregator 
sites (Hong 2012). Furthermore, I would expect relatively less traffic to be directed to 
politicians’ Twitter accounts by search engines or aggregators, as people often search 
for politicians’ names to find their Twitter accounts. Thus, the question of whether 
politicians’ online networks in Twitter are concentrated is a matter for empirical 
investigation.  
I conducted two descriptive analyses in order to compare the sizes of online and 
offline networks. First, I plotted Lorenz curves for both online and offline networks 
and then conducted the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to compare the network 
distributions. Table 4.9 presents the results of the K-S test, indicating a statistically 
significant difference between the two distributions. Figure 4.6 plots the Lorenz 
curves
27
 for the online and offline networks. Taken together, the K-S test and Lorenz 
curves show that the distributions of online and offline networks differ, the online 
network being more concentrated.  
 
 
                                                          
27
 A Lorenz curve is a graphic representation of the cumulative distribution function of the empirical-
probability distribution. Every point on the curve represents a statement such as, “The bottom x percent 
of all politicians have y percent of the total market share.” Thus, Figure 1 shows that the top 10 percent 
of politicians own approximately 22 percent of the total offline market share. For the online market 
share, however, the top 10 percent owns 55 percent of the market. 
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Figure 4.6 : Lorenz Curves of Online and Offline Networks 
 
 
Table 4.9: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Equality of the Two 
Distributions 
Smaller Group Coefficient D P-value Corrected 
Offline network 0.7441 0.000  
Online network 0.0000 1.000  
Combined Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 0.7441 0.000 0.000 
 
 
4.7.2. GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITY 
The social media foster communication among a more diverse group of people and 
allow politicians to connect with people who are geographically distant but who share 
a common interest in policy issues. To test the geographical diversity of online and 
offline networks, I defined the two variables outlined in the foregoing chapter: out-of-
state and in-state shares. When comparing geographic information between offline 
and online networks, I excluded international Twitter followers from the total number 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
L
o
re
n
z
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative population proportion
Offline Network Online Network
 148 
 
of followers, considering only those within the U.S. 
As in the previous analysis of network size, I compared Lorenz curves for the 
offline and online out-of-state shares and conducted a K-S test. Both tests indicated 
that the distributions of offline and online out-of-state shares differed, with the online 
network being more geographically diverse. 
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